Authoritarianism
Authoritarianism is a form of government characterized by strong central power and limited political freedoms. Political scientists have created many typologies describing variations of authoritarian forms of government. Authoritarian regimes may be either autocratic or oligarchic in nature and may be based upon the rule of a party or the military.
In an influential 1964 work, the political scientist Juan Linz defined authoritarianism as possessing four qualities:
- Limited political pluralism, realized with constraints on the legislature, political parties and interest groups.
- Political legitimacy based upon appeals to emotion and identification of the regime as a necessary evil to combat "easily recognizable societal problems, such as underdevelopment or insurgency".
- Minimal political mobilization and suppression of anti-regime activities.
- Ill-defined executive powers, often vague and shifting, which extends the power of the executive.
Characteristics
In general
Authoritarianism is characterized by highly concentrated and centralized power maintained by political repression and the exclusion of potential challengers. It uses political parties and mass organizations to mobilize people around the goals of the regime. Adam Przeworski has theorized that "authoritarian equilibrium rests mainly on lies, fear and economic prosperity".Authoritarianism also tends to embrace the informal and unregulated exercise of political power, a leadership that is "self-appointed and even if elected cannot be displaced by citizens' free choice among competitors", the arbitrary deprivation of civil liberties and little tolerance for meaningful opposition. A range of social controls also attempt to stifle civil society while political stability is maintained by control over and support of the armed forces, a bureaucracy staffed by the regime and creation of allegiance through various means of socialization and indoctrination.
Authoritarianism is marked by "indefinite political tenure" of the ruler or ruling party or other authority. The transition from an authoritarian system to a more democratic form of government is referred to as democratization.
Systemic weakness and resilience
notes that "regime theory holds that authoritarian systems are inherently fragile because of weak legitimacy, overreliance on coercion, over-centralization of decision making, and the predominance of personal power over institutional norms. Few authoritarian regimes—be they communist, fascist, corporatist, or personalist—have managed to conduct orderly, peaceful, timely, and stable successions".Political scientist Theodore M. Vestal writes that authoritarian political systems may be weakened through inadequate responsiveness to either popular or elite demands and that the authoritarian tendency to respond to challenges by exerting tighter control, instead of by adapting, may compromise the legitimacy of an authoritarian state and lead to its collapse.
One exception to this general trend is the endurance of the authoritarian rule of the Chinese Communist Party which has been unusually resilient among authoritarian regimes. Nathan posits that this can be attributed to four factors such as "the increasingly norm-bound nature of its succession politics"; "the increase in meritocratic as opposed to factional considerations in the promotion of political elites"; "the differentiation and functional specialization of institutions within the regime"; and "the establishment of institutions for political participation and appeal that strengthen the CCP's legitimacy among the public at large".
Institutions
Within authoritarian systems, there may be nominally democratic institutions such as political parties, legislatures and elections, but they are managed in a way so as to entrench authoritarian regimes. Within democracies, parties serve to coordinate the pursuit of interests for like-minded citizens, whereas in authoritarian systems, they are a way for authoritarian leaders to find capable elites for the regime. In a democracy, a legislature is intended to represent the diversity of interests among citizens, whereas authoritarians use legislatures to signal their own restraint towards other elites as well as to monitor other elites who pose a challenge to the regime.Fraudulent elections may serve the role of signaling the strength of the regime, as well as force other elites to demonstrate their loyalty to the regime, whereas in democracies, free and fair elections are used to select representatives who represent the will of the citizens. Elections may also motivate authoritarian party members to strengthen patron–client and information-gathering networks, which strengthens the authoritarian regime. Elections may also motivate members of the ruling class to engage in public goods provision.
According to one study, "most dictatorships led by parties have regular popular elections". Prior to the 1990s, most of these elections had no alternative parties or candidates for voters to vote on. Since the end of the Cold War, about two-thirds of elections in authoritarian systems allow for some opposition, but the elections are structured in a way to heavily favor the incumbent authoritarian regime.
Hindrances to free and fair elections in authoritarian systems may include:
- Control of the media by the authoritarian incumbents.
- Interference with opposition campaigning.
- Electoral fraud.
- Violence against opposition.
- Large-scale spending by the state in favor of the incumbents.
- Permitting of some parties, but not others.
- Prohibitions on opposition parties, but not independent candidates.
- Allowing competition between candidates within the incumbent party, but not those who are not in the incumbent party.
Constitutions in authoritarian regimes
The concept of "authoritarian constitutionalism" has been developed by legal scholar Mark Tushnet. Tushnet distinguishes authoritarian constitutionalist regimes from "liberal constitutionalist" regimes and from purely authoritarian regimes. He describes authoritarian constitutionalist regimes as authoritarian dominant-party states that impose sanctions against, but do not arbitrarily arrest, political dissidents; permits "reasonably open discussion and criticism of its policies"; hold "reasonably free and fair elections", without systemic intimidation, but "with close attention to such matters as the drawing of election districts and the creation of party lists to ensure as best it can that it will prevail—and by a substantial margin"; reflect at least occasional responsiveness to public opinion; and create "mechanisms to ensure that the amount of dissent does not exceed the level it regards as desirable". Tushnet cites Singapore as an example of an authoritarian constitutionalist state, and connects the concept to that of hybrid regimes.
Violence
Yale University political scientist Milan Svolik argues that violence is a common characteristic of authoritarian systems. Violence tends to be common in authoritarian states because of a lack of independent third parties empowered to settle disputes between the dictator, regime allies, regime soldiers and the masses.Authoritarians may resort to measures referred to as "coup-proofing", i.e. structures that make it hard for any small group to seize power. These coup-proofing strategies may include the strategic placing of family, ethnic, and religious groups in the military; creation of an armed force parallel to the regular military; and development of multiple internal security agencies with overlapping jurisdiction that constantly monitor one another. Research shows that some coup-proofing strategies reduce the risk of coups occurring. However, coup-proofing reduces military effectiveness, and limits the rents that an incumbent can extract. A 2016 study shows that the implementation of succession rules reduce the occurrence of coup attempts. Succession rules are believed to hamper coordination efforts among coup plotters by assuaging elites who have more to gain by patience than by plotting. According to political scientists Curtis Bell and Jonathan Powell, coup attempts in neighbouring countries lead to greater coup-proofing and coup-related repression in a region. A 2017 study finds that countries' coup-proofing strategies are heavily influenced by other countries with similar histories. A 2018 study in the Journal of Peace Research found that leaders who survive coup attempts and respond by purging known and potential rivals are likely to have longer tenures as leaders. A 2019 study in Conflict Management and Peace Science found that personalist dictatorships are more likely to take coup-proofing measures than other authoritarian regimes; the authors argue that this is because "personalists are characterized by weak institutions and narrow support bases, a lack of unifying ideologies and informal links to the ruler".
According to a 2019 study, personalist dictatorships are more repressive than other forms of dictatorship.
Manipulation of information
According to a 2019 study by Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman, authoritarian regimes have over time become less reliant on violence and mass repression to maintain control. The study shows instead that authoritarians have increasingly resorted to manipulation of information as a means of control. Authoritarians increasingly seek to create an appearance of good performance, conceal state repression, and imitate democracy.Interactions with other elites and the masses
The foundations of stable authoritarian rule are that the authoritarian prevents contestation from the masses and other elites. The authoritarian regime may use co-optation or repression to prevent revolts.Economy
Scholars such as Seymour Lipset, Carles Boix, Susan Stokes, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Stephens and John Stephens argue that economic development increases the likelihood of democratization. Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi argue that while economic development makes democracies less likely to turn authoritarian, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that development causes democratization.Eva Bellin argues that under certain circumstances the bourgeoise and labor are more likely to favor democratization, but less so under other circumstances. Economic development can boost public support for authoritarian regimes in the short-to-medium term.
Typologies
Several subtypes of authoritarian regimes have been identified by Linz and others. Linz identified the two most basic subtypes as traditional authoritarian regimes and bureaucratic-military authoritarian regimes:- Traditional authoritarian regimes are those "in which the ruling authority " is maintained in power "through a combination of appeals to traditional legitimacy, patron-client ties and repression, which is carried out by an apparatus bound to the ruling authority through personal loyalties". An example is Ethiopia under Haile Selassie I.
- Bureaucratic-military authoritarian regimes are those "governed by a coalition of military officers and technocrats who act pragmatically within the limits of their bureaucratic mentality". Mark J. Gasiorowski suggests that it is best to distinguish "simple military authoritarian regimes" from "bureaucratic authoritarian regimes" in which "a powerful group of technocrats uses the state apparatus to try to rationalize and develop the economy" such as South Korea under Park Chung-hee.
- Corporatist authoritarian regimes "are those in which corporatism institutions are used extensively by the state to coopt and demobilize powerful interest groups". This type has been studied most extensively in Latin America.
- Racial and ethnic "democracies" are those in which "certain racial or ethnic groups enjoy full democratic rights while others are largely or entirely denied those rights", such as in South Africa under apartheid.
- Post-totalitarian authoritarian regimes are those in which totalitarian institutions remain, but where "ideological orthodoxy has declined in favor of routinization, repression has declined, the state's top leadership is less personalized and more secure, and the level of mass mobilization has declined substantially". Examples include the Russian Federation and Soviet Eastern Bloc states in the mid-1980s. The post-Mao Zedong People's Republic of China was viewed as post-totalitarian in the 1990s and early 2000s, with a limited degree of increase in pluralism and civil society. however, in the 2010s, particularly after Xi Jinping succeeded as General Secretary of the Communist Party of China and rose to power in 2012, Chinese state repression sharply increased, aided by digital control and mass surveillance.
A typology of authoritarian regimes by political scientists Brian Lai and Dan Slater includes four categories: machine ; bossism ; juntas ; and strongman. Lai and Slater argue that single‐party regimes are better than military regimes at developing institutions that are effective at continuing the regime's incumbency and diminishing domestic challengers; Lai and Slater also argue that military regimes more often initiate military conflicts or undertake other "desperate measures" to maintain control as compared to single‐party regimes.
John Duckitt suggests a link between authoritarianism and collectivism, asserting that both stand in opposition to individualism. Duckitt writes that both authoritarianism and collectivism submerge individual rights and goals to group goals, expectations and conformities.
Authoritarianism and totalitarianism
Linz distinguished new forms of authoritarianism from personalistic dictatorships and totalitarian states, taking Francoist Spain as an example. Unlike personalistic dictatorships, new forms of authoritarianism have institutionalized representation of a variety of actors. Unlike totalitarian states, the regime relies on passive mass acceptance rather than popular support. Totalitarianism is an extreme version of authoritarianism. Authoritarianism primarily differs from totalitarianism in that social and economic institutions exist that are not under governmental control. Building on the work of Yale political scientist Juan Linz, Paul C. Sondrol of the University of Colorado at Colorado Springs has examined the characteristics of authoritarian and totalitarian dictators and organized them in a chart:| Totalitarianism | Authoritarianism | |
| Charisma | High | Low |
| Role conception | Leader as function | Leader as individual |
| Ends of power | Public | Private |
| Corruption | Low | High |
| Official ideology | Yes | No |
| Limited pluralism | No | Yes |
| Legitimacy | Yes | No |
Sondrol argues that while both authoritarianism and totalitarianism are forms of autocracy, they differ in "key dichotomies":
Compared to totalitarianism, "the authoritarian state still maintains a certain distinction between state and society. It is only concerned with political power and as long as that is not contested it gives society a certain degree of liberty. Totalitarianism, on the other hand, invades private life and asphyxiates it". Another distinction is that "authoritarianism is not animated by utopian ideals in the way totalitarianism is. It does not attempt to change the world and human nature". Carl Joachim Friedrich writes that "a totalist ideology, a party reinforced by a secret police, and monopoly control of industrial mass society" are the three features of totalitarian regimes that distinguish them from other autocracies.
Competitive authoritarian regimes
Another type of authoritarian regime is the competitive authoritarian regime, a type of civilian regime that arose in the post-Cold War era. In a competitive authoritarian regime, "formal democratic institutions exist and are widely viewed as the primary means of gaining power, but... incumbents' abuse of the state places them at a significant advantage vis-à-vis their opponents". The term was coined by Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way in their 2010 book of the same name to discuss a type of hybrid regime that emerged during and after the Cold War.Competitive authoritarian regimes differ from fully authoritarian regimes in that elections are regularly held, the opposition can openly operate without a high risk of exile or imprisonment and "democratic procedures are sufficiently meaningful for opposition groups to take them seriously as arenas through which to contest for power". However, competitive authoritarian regimes lack one or more of the three characteristics of democracies such as free elections ; protection of civil liberties and an even playing field.
Authoritarianism and democracy
Authoritarianism and democracy are not necessarily fundamental opposites as it is possible for some democracies to possess authoritarian elements, and for an authoritarian system to have democratic elements. An illiberal democracy, or procedural democracy, is distinguished from liberal democracy, or substantive democracy, in that illiberal democracies lack features such as the rule of law, protections for minority groups, an independent judiciary and the real separation of powers.A further distinction that liberal democracies have rarely made war with one another; research has extended the theory and finds that more democratic countries tend to have few wars causing fewer battle deaths with one another and that democracies have far fewer civil wars.
Research shows that the democratic nations have much less democide or murder by government. Those were also moderately developed nations before applying liberal democratic policies. Research by the World Bank suggests that political institutions are extremely important in determining the prevalence of corruption and that parliamentary systems, political stability and freedom of the press are all associated with lower corruption.
A 2006 study by economist Alberto Abadie has concluded that terrorism is most common in nations with intermediate political freedom. The nations with the least amount of terrorism are the most and least democratic nations, and that "transitions from an authoritarian regime to a democracy may be accompanied by temporary increases in terrorism". Studies in 2013 and 2017 similarly found a nonlinear relationship between political freedom and terrorism, with the most terrorist attacks occurring in partial democracies and the fewest in "strict autocracies and full-fledged democracies". A 2018 study by Amichai Magen demonstrated that liberal democracies and polyarchies not only suffer fewer terrorist attacks as compared to other regime types, but also suffer fewer casualties in terrorist attacks as compared to other regime types, which may be attributed to higher-quality democracies' responsiveness to their citizens' demands, including "the desire for physical safety", resulting in "investment in intelligence, infrastructure protection, first responders, social resilience, and specialized medical care" which averts casualties. Magen also noted that terrorism in closed autocracies sharply increased starting in 2013.
Authoritarianism and fascism
Authoritarianism is considered a core concept of fascism and scholars agree that a fascist regime is foremost an authoritarian form of government, although not all authoritarian regimes are fascist. While authoritarianism is a defining characteristic of fascism, scholars argue that more distinguishing traits are needed to make an authoritarian regime fascist.Effect on development
Some commentators such as Seymour Martin Lipset argue that low-income authoritarian regimes have certain technocratic "efficiency-enhancing advantages" over low-income democracies that gives authoritarian regimes an advantage in economic development. By contrast, Morton H. Halperin, Joseph T. Siegle and Michael M. Weinstein argue that democracies "realize superior development performance" over authoritarianism, pointing out that poor democracies are more likely to have steadier economic growth and less likely to experience economic and humanitarian catastrophes than authoritarian regimes; that civil liberties in democracies act as a curb on corruption and misuse of resources; and that democracies are more adaptable than authoritarian regimes.Studies suggest that several health indicators have a stronger and more significant association with democracy than they have with GDP per capita, size of the public sector or income inequality. Prominent economist Amartya Sen has theorized that no functioning liberal democracy has ever suffered a large-scale famine.
Examples
There is no one consensus definition of authoritarianism, but several annual measurements are attempted, including Freedom House's annual Freedom in the World report.Current
The following is a non-exhaustive list of examples of states which are currently or frequently characterized as authoritarian.| State | Time period | Ruling group or person | Notes |
| 1975– | People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola | ||
| 1993– | New Azerbaijan Party | ||
| 1746– | House of Khalifa | ||
| 1994– | Alexander Lukashenko | ||
| 2006– | Milorad Dodik | ||
| 1985– | Hun Sen | ||
| 1982– | Paul Biya | ||
| 1990– | Idriss Deby | ||
| 1949– | Communist Party of China | "Some scholars have deemed the Chinese system a 'fragmented authoritarianism', a 'negotiated state' or a 'consultative authoritarian regime'". According to research by John Kennedy et al., Chinese citizens with higher education tend to participate less in local elections and have lower levels of democratic values when compared to those with only compulsory education. | |
| 1979– | Denis Sassou Nguesso | ||
| 1959– | Communist Party of Cuba | ||
| 2014– | Abdel Fattah el-Sisi | ||
| 1979– | Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo | ||
| 1993– | Isaias Afwerki | ||
| 1961– | Gabonese Democratic Party | ||
| 2010– | Viktor Orbán | It has recently moved more towards illiberalism. | |
| 1981– | Ruhollah Khomeini and Ali Khamenei | Linz wrote in 2000 that "it is difficult to fit the Iranian regime into the existing typology, as it combines the ideological bent of totalitarianism with the limited pluralism of authoritarianism and holds regular elections in which candidates advocating differing policies and incumbents are often defeated". | |
| 1946– | House of Hashim | ||
| 1990– | Nur Otan | ||
| 1975– | Lao People's Revolutionary Party | ||
| 1957– | Alaouite dynasty | ||
| 1990– | Democratic Party of Socialists of Montenegro | ||
| 1947– | Kim dynasty and the Korean Workers' Party | ||
| 1970– | House of Al Said | ||
| 1964–2006 | Palestine Liberation Organization | ||
| 2006– | Hamas | ||
| 1971– | House of Thani | ||
| 1999– | United Russia under Vladimir Putin | Has authoritarian tendencies and is described by some as "really a mixture of authoritarianism and managed democracy". | |
| 2000– | Paul Kagame | ||
| 1744– | House of Saud | ||
| 2012– | Serbian Progressive Party under Aleksandar Vučić | ||
| 1965– | People's Action Party | ||
| 2011– | Sudan People's Liberation Movement under Salva Kiir Mayardit | ||
| 1963– | Ba'athist regime and al-Assad family | ||
| 1994– | Emomali Rahmon | ||
| 2003– | Justice and Development Party under Recep Tayyip Erdogan | Described as a "competitive authoritarian regime". | |
| 1991– | Democratic Party of Turkmenistan | ||
| 1972– | Royal families of the United Arab Emirates | ||
| 1964– | |||
| 1989– | Uzbekistan Liberal Democratic Party | ||
| 1999– | United Socialist Party of Venezuela under Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro | ||
| 1976– | Vietnamese Communist Party |
Historical
The following is a non-exhaustive list of examples of states which were historically authoritarian.| State | Time period | Ruling group or person | Notes |
| 1999–2019 | Abdelaziz Bouteflika | ||
| 1966–1973 | Military government | Argentine Revolution period of military rule. | |
| 1973–1974 | Justicialista rule of Juan Perón | Ideology is populist authoritarianism. | |
| 1976–1983 | Free trade and deregulatory rule of Jorge Rafael Videla | National Reorganization Process period of military rule. | |
| 1934–1938 | Party of National Unity | Federal State of Austria. | |
| Brazil | 1937–1945 | Getúlio Vargas | Estado Novo period. |
| Brazil | 1964–1985 | Military government | |
| Burma | 1962–2011 | Military government and Socialist Programme Party | |
 Burundi | 2005–2020 | Pierre Nkurunziza | |
| 1973–1990 | Augusto Pinochet | ||
| Republic of China | 1927–1949 | Kuomintang and Nationalist government | |
| 1965–2019 | Mobutu Sese Seko, Laurent-Désiré Kabila and Joseph Kabila | ||
| 1990–1999 | Franjo Tuđman | ||
| 1938–1939 | Party of National Unity | ||
| 1952–2011 | Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak | ||
| 1991–2019 | Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front | ||
| Kingdom of Hungary | 1920–1944 | Miklós Horthy, Unity Party | |
| 1967–1998 | Suharto | New Order. | |
| 1925–1979 | Pahlavi dynasty | ||
| Libya | 1969–2011 | Muammar Gaddafi | |
| 1926–1940 | Antanas Smetona | ||
| 2006–2016 | Nikola Gruevski | ||
| 1926–1933 | Military government | National Dictatorship. | |
| 1933–1974 | António de Oliveira Salazar and Marcelo Caetano | Under the Estado Novo regime. | |
| Spain | 1936–1975 | Francisco Franco | |
| South Africa | 1948–1994 | National Party | Regime ended with the end of apartheid. |
| 1948–1960 | Syngman Rhee | ||
| 1962–1987 | Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan | ||
| 1989–2019 | Omar al-Bashir | ||
| 1945–1986 | Kuomintang | ||
| 2014–2019 | Prayut Chan-o-cha | Overthrew the democratically elected government of Yingluck Shinawatra in a military coup and installed a military junta to oversee the governance of Thailand. | |
| 1925–1945 | Republican People's Party | ||
| 1944–1980 | Josip Broz Tito | ||
| 1991–2000 | Slobodan Milošević | ||
| 1980–2017 | Robert Mugabe |
Historical trends
Anti-authoritarianism
Both World War II and the Cold War resulted in the replacement of authoritarian regimes by either democratic regimes or regimes that were less authoritarian.World War II saw the defeat of the Axis powers by the Allied powers. All the Axis powers had totalitarian or authoritarian governments, and two of the three were replaced by governments based on democratic constitutions. The Allied powers were an alliance of Democratic states and the Communist Soviet Union. At least in Western Europe the initial post-war era embraced pluralism and freedom of expression in areas that had been under control of authoritarian regimes. The memory of fascism and Nazism was denigrated. The new Federal Republic of Germany banned its expression. In reaction to the centralism of the Nazi state, the new constitution of West Germany exercised "separation of powers" and placed "law enforcement firmly in the hands" of the sixteen Länder or states of the republic, not with the federal German government, at least not at first.
Culturally there was also a strong sense of anti-authoritarianism based on anti-fascism in Western Europe. This was attributed to the active resistance from occupation and to fears arising from the development of superpowers. Anti-authoritarianism also became associated with countercultural and bohemian movements such as the Beat Generation in the 1950s, the hippies in the 1960s and punks in the 1970s.
In South America, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, Chile and Uruguay moved away from dictatorships to democracy between 1982 and 1990.
With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the Soviet Union in 1991, the other authoritarian/totalitarian "half" of the Allied Powers of World War II collapsed. This led not so much to revolt against authority in general, but to the belief that authoritarian states were outdated. The idea that "liberal democracy was the final form toward which all political striving was directed" became very popular in Western countries and was celebrated in Francis Fukuyama's book The End of History and the Last Man. According to Charles H. Fairbanks Jr., "all the new states that stumbled out of the ruins of the Soviet bloc, except Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, seemed indeed to be moving toward democracy in the early 1990s" as where the countries of East Central Europe and the Balkans.
In late 2010, the Arab Spring arose in response to unrest over economic stagnation but also in opposition to oppressive authoritarian regimes, first in Tunisia and spreading to Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Syria, Bahrain and elsewhere. Regimes were toppled in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and partially in Yemen while other countries saw riots, civil wars or insurgencies.
Authoritarian revival
From 2005 to 2015, observers noted what some called a "democratic recession", although some such as Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way have disputed this theory. In 2018, the Freedom House declared that from 2006 to 2018 "113 countries" around the world showed "a net decline" in "political rights and civil liberties" while "only 62" experienced "a net improvement".Writing in 2018, American political journalist David Frum stated:
The hopeful world of the very late 20th century—the world of NAFTA and an expanding NATO; of the World Wide Web 1.0 and liberal interventionism; of the global spread of democracy under leaders such as Václav Havel and Nelson Mandela—now looks battered and delusive.
Michael Ignatieff wrote that Fukuyama's idea of liberalism vanquishing authoritarianism "now looks like a quaint artifact of a vanished unipolar moment" and Fukuyama himself expressed concern. By 2018, only one Arab Spring uprising resulted in a transition to constitutional democratic governance and a "resurgence of authoritarianism and Islamic extremism" in the region was dubbed the Arab Winter.
Various explanations have been offered for the new spread of authoritarianism. They include the downside of globalization and the success of the Beijing Consensus, i.e. the authoritarian model of the People's Republic of China. In countries such as the United States, factors blamed for the growth of authoritarianism include the financial crisis of 2007–2008 and slower real wage growth as well as social media's elimination of so-called "gatekeepers" of knowledge so that a large fraction of the population considers to be opinion what were once "viewed as verifiable facts", including everything from the danger of global warming to the preventing the spread of disease through vaccination.
Works cited
- Linz, Juan J.. "An Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Spain". In Allard, Eric; Littunen, Yrjo. Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems. Helsinki: Academic Bookstore.