The Battle of Chamb, 1971 was a battle in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971. The Pakistani Army invaded Chamb on the same principle as the Battle of Chamb. The Pakistan Army's primary objective was to capture the town of Chamb and surrounding areas which had strategic importance for both Pakistan and India. Before the capture of Chamb by Pakistan forces, this western sector was under India's control. Similar to 1965, plans were made to capture this strategic town. The reason behind this plan was to deter Indians from attacking the crucial north-south line of communications passing via Gujrat. The 23 Division of Pakistan was given the task of protecting this sector and later attacking the Chamb-Dewa sectors. On the Indian side, the 10th Division was given the task of defence of Chamb; the Indian army believed that by attacking Gujrat and Tanda, they could guarantee the defence of Chamb. In comparison to 1965, the Indians were better prepared in terms of defences and now realized the importance of the town and sector. Brigadier Amar Cheema of the Indian Army, while comparing the strength of two countries during the battle, claimed that Indian armed forces had superior tanks such as T-55 and T-54 who were equipped with 100 mm guns. They were said to be far superior to those of the Pakistani Type 59 tank. The T-55 Tanks also possessed pads ammunition firing capability which the Type 59 tank did not have. The T-55 had far superior stabilisation system. Cheema also claims that there was near parity in terms of artillery but when it came to infantry Pakistan army had less soldiers than the Indian army during the battle. He states that 'it was this battle which helped in sustaining the morale of Pakistan army. The Indians, on the other hand, describe it as a most serious reverse suffered in the 1971 war'. Under the Simla Agreement, signed between India and Pakistan on 2 July 1972; Pakistan retained the territory it captured in the Chamb sector whereas India retained the territory it captured on the Pakistani side of the ceasefire line opposite the Kargil sector. Later Gen Andre Beaufre of the French Army, who was invited by Pakistan and remained there throughout the war and who also later went to India by invitation and toured the battlefields after the ceasefire felt that it was difficult to get an accurate picture because both India and Pakistan grossly exaggerated the casualties in men and material inflicted on the adversary. He gave two examples to support his view. The Pakistani commanders in the Chhamb sector claimed that a brigade of four battalions supported by a regiment of armour and five artillery regiments had annihilated an Indian infantry brigade and captured many tanks, a large number of other vehicles and large quantities of arms and equipment. Some pictures shown to him in support of these claims appeared to him to be the product of trick photography. He visited the Chhamb sector soon after the main battle but did not see much captured equipment, and it certainly bore no relation to the much-publicized Pakistani claims. According to Gen Beaufre, the Pakistani offensive in the Chhamb sector lacked boldness. Their forces moved slowly, and because of inadequate training and faulty planning, marrying of infantry and armour was delayed and resulted in a halt at the Manawar Wali Tawi, thus giving the Indians time to reinforce their position. Pakistan attacked positions west of the river with four battalions supported by one armoured regiment and five artillery regiments. Armour was not used in a concentrated manner, and artillery fire was spread all over instead of focusing on one objective at a time. Beaufre would have liked at least two brigades to attack simultaneously in the initial phase, followed by at least one brigade and a couple of armoured regiments to break through after securing the river line. A small force infiltrated behind the Indian defences over the Kachrael heights was not enough. A larger force in the same role would have definitely altered the situation.
