Battle of the Bowling Alley
In the Battle of the Bowling Alley , United Nations Command forces defeated North Korean forces early in the Korean War near the city of Taegu, South Korea. The battle took place in a narrow valley, dubbed the "Bowling Alley", which was north of Taegu. It followed a week of fighting between the Korean People's Army 13th Division and the Republic of Korea Army's 1st Division along the latter's last defensible line in the hills north of the city. Reinforcements, including the US Army's 27th and 23rd Infantry Regiments were committed to bolster the ROK defenses. This battle and several others were smaller engagements of the Battle of Pusan Perimeter.
For another week, KPA divisions launched all the troops they had in massed attacks against the ROK and US lines. Their attacks, which usually occurred at night and were supported by armor and artillery, advanced with infantry and tanks in close support of one another. Each KPA attack ran into well-established UN lines, where US tanks, mines and entrenched infantry were positioned to counter them. Strikes by US aircraft ravaged the attacking KPA. The fighting was fierce with many casualties on both sides, particularly where the KPA and ROK fought one another. The repeated attacks eventually broke and pushed back the ROK forces. They continued their push against the Pusan Perimeter until they were outflanked in the Battle of Inchon.
Background
Outbreak of war
Following the invasion of the South Korea by North Korea on June 25, 1950, the United Nations voted to use force to defend South Korea. The United States simultaneously committed ground forces to the Korean peninsula with the goal of pushing back the North Korean invasion and preventing South Korea from collapsing. But US forces in the Far East had been steadily decreasing since the end of World War II, five years earlier, and at the time the closest force was the 24th Infantry Division, headquartered in Japan. The division was understrength, and most of its equipment was antiquated due to reductions in military spending. Nevertheless, the 24th was ordered to South Korea.The 24th Infantry Division was the first US unit sent into Korea with the mission to take the initial "shock" of KPA advances, delaying much larger KPA units to buy time to allow reinforcements to arrive. The division fought for several weeks while the 1st Cavalry, 7th Infantry and 25th Infantry Divisions and Eighth United States Army supporting units were arriving. Advance elements of the 24th Division were badly defeated in the Battle of Osan on July 5, the first encounter between US and KPA forces. For the first month after the defeat at Osan, the 24th Infantry Division was repeatedly defeated and forced south by superior KPA numbers and equipment. The regiments of the division were systematically pushed south in engagements around Chochiwon, Chonan, and Pyongtaek. The 24th Division was finally annihilated in the Battle of Taejon, but was able to delay the KPA forces until July 20. By that time, the Eighth Army's force of combat troops were roughly equal to KPA forces attacking the region, with new UN units arriving every day.
North Korean advance
After the fight at Taejon, UN forces were pushed back repeatedly before finally halting the KPA advance in a series of engagements in the southern section of the country. Forces of the 3rd Battalion, 29th Infantry, newly arrived in the country, were wiped out at Hadong in a coordinated ambush by North Korean forces on July 27, opening a pass to the Pusan area from the west. Soon after, North Korean forces took Chinju, east of Hadong, pushing back the US 19th Infantry Regiment and leaving routes to Pusan open to direct KPA attacks. The UN formations were subsequently able to defeat the KPA in the Battle of the Notch on August 2, halting their advance from the west. Suffering mounting losses, the KPA force withdrew for several days to re-equip and receive reinforcements. This granted both sides a reprieve to prepare for the attack on the Pusan Perimeter.Taegu
Meanwhile, the Eighth Army commander Lieutenant General Walton Walker had established Taegu as his headquarters. At the center of the Pusan Perimeter line, Taegu stood at the entrance to the Naktong River valley, an area where KPA forces could advance in large numbers in close support. The natural barriers provided by the Naktong River to the south and the mountainous terrain to the north converged around Taegu, a transportation hub and the last major South Korean city aside from Pusan itself to remain in UN hands. From south to north, the city was defended by the US 1st Cavalry Division, the ROK 1st Division and the 6th Division, which were under the command of ROK II Corps. The 1st Cavalry Division was spread out along a long line on the Naktong River to the south, with its 5th and 8th Cavalry Regiments holding a line along the river south of Waegwan, facing west. The 7th Cavalry Regiment held position to the east in reserve, along with artillery forces, ready to reinforce anywhere a KPA crossing could be attempted. The ROK 1st Division held a northwest-facing line in the mountains immediately north of the city while the ROK 6th Division held position to the east, guarding the narrow valley holding the Kunwi road into the Pusan Perimeter area.Five KPA divisions amassed around Taegu to oppose the UN forces in the city. From south to north, the 10th, 3rd, 15th, 13th, and 1st North Korean Divisions occupied a wide line encircling Taegu from Tuksong-dong and around Waegwan to Kunwi. The KPA planned to use the natural corridor of the Naktong River valley from Sangju to Taegu as its main axis of attack for the next push south, so the KPA divisions all eventually moved through this valley, crossing the Naktong at different areas along the low ground. Elements of the KPA 105th Armored Division also supported the attack.
Prelude
US forces assemble
During mid-August, the US 27th Infantry Regiment was mopping up KPA resistance from the southern part of the Naktong Bulge area to counter a KPA attack there. The regiment, temporarily attached to the US 24th Infantry Division, was recalled by the Eighth Army when a new KPA threat formed to the north of Taegu, alarming Walker. Acting on the threat, Walker relieved the regiment from the 24th Infantry Division on August 14 and the next day ordered it northward to Kyongsan as a reserve force. Arriving at Kyongsan on August 16, Colonel John H. Michaelis, 27th Infantry's commander, was ordered to reconnoiter routes east, north, northwest, and west of Kyongsan and counter any KPA attacks from these directions. During the day, two KPA T-34 tanks came through the ROK 1st Division lines north of Taegu at Tabu-dong, but ROK 3.5-inch bazooka teams knocked out both of them. The ROK 1st Division, also in the area, was ordered to assemble in the hills around the road and wait for reinforcements or make a last stand if needed to prevent the KPA from coming any closer to Taegu. To its east was the ROK 6th Division and to its west was the Naktong River.Paik Sun Yup.
At 12:00 the next day, August 17, Eighth Army ordered the 27th Infantry to move its headquarters and a reinforced battalion "without delay" to a point across the Kumho River north of Taegu on the road from Tabu-dong to Sangju "to secure Taegu from enemy penetration" from that direction. South Korean sources reported a KPA regiment, led by six T-34 tanks, had entered the village of Kumhwa, north of Tabu-dong. The 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, a platoon of the Heavy Mortar Company, and most of the 8th Field Artillery Battalion moved north to Ch'ilgok where the ROK 1st Division command post was located. By nightfall, the entire 27th Regiment was north of Taegu on the Tabu-dong road, reinforced by C Company, 73rd Tank Battalion. US Army commanders also ordered the 37th Field Artillery Battalion to move from the area around Kyongju and P'ohang-dong, where a heavy battle had been in progress for days, for attachment to the US 27th Infantry Regiment in order to reinforce the 8th Field Artillery Battalion above Taegu. It arrived there the next day. At the front, ROK 1st Division commander Brigadier General Paik Sun-yup assumed senior command of the 27th Infantry and the other US units, to the chagrin of Michaelis.
North Korean forces assemble
In its engagements during the Perimeter battle, the KPA 13th Division, with 9,500 men, had forced ROK troops into the Tabu-dong corridor and started advancing on Taegu. This division had battled the ROK 11th and 12th Regiments in the Yuhak-san area for a week before it broke through to the corridor on August 17. A regimental commander of the division said later it suffered 1,500 casualties in the process. On August 18, the 13th Division was concentrated mostly west of the road just north of Tabu-dong.To the west of the KPA 13th Division, the KPA 15th Division with 5,000 men was also deployed on Yuhak-san. It, too, had begun battling the ROK 1st Division, but thus far only in minor engagements. The KPA High Command then ordered the KPA 15th Division to move from its position northwest of Tabu-dong eastward, to the Yongch'on front, where the KPA 8th Division had tried and failed to advance to the Taegu lateral corridor. The KPA 15th Division left the Yuhak-san area on August 20. Meanwhile, the KPA 1st Division, to the east of the 13th, advanced to the Kunwi area, north of Taegu. The KPA command ordered it to proceed to the Tabu-dong area and maneuver astride the 13th Division for the attack on Taegu down the Tabu-dong corridor. At the same time, the KPA received their only substantial tank reinforcements during the Pusan Perimeter fighting. On August 15, the KPA 105th Armored Division received 21 new T-34 tanks and 200 troop replacements, which it distributed to the divisions attacking Taegu. The tank regiment with the KPA 13th Division reportedly had 14 T-34 tanks.
On August 18, the KPA 13th Division was astride the Sangju–Taegu road just above Tabu-dong and only from Taegu. The Eighth Army ordered the 27th Infantry Regiment to attack north along the road to counter the threat. At the same time, two regiments of the ROK 1st Division were to attack along high ground on either side of the road. The plan called for a limited-objective attack to restore the ROK 1st Division lines in the vicinity of Sokchok, a village north of Tabu-dong. M26 Pershing tanks of C Company, 73rd Tank Battalion, and two batteries of the 37th Field Artillery Battalion were to support the 27th Infantry in the attack.
Terrain
In front of the 27th Infantry position, the poplar-lined Taegu–Sangju road ran northward in the narrow mountain valley. A stream on the west closely paralleled the road, which was nearly straight on a north-south axis through the 27th Infantry position and for some distance northward. This stretch of the road later became known as the "Bowling Alley." About in front of the 27th Infantry position the road forked at a small village called Ch'onp'yong-dong; the western prong was the main Sangju road, the eastern one was the road to Kunwi. At the road fork, the Sangju road bends to the northwest in a long curve. The village of Sinjumak lay on this curve a short distance north of the fork. Hills protected it against direct fire from the 27th Infantry position. It was there that the KPA tanks remained hidden during the daytime.Rising from the valley on the west side was the Yuhak-san mountain range which swept up to a height of. On the east, a similar mountain range rose to a height of, culminating southward in a mountain called Ka-san, more than high at its walled summit. The Kunwi and Sangju roads from the northeast and northwest entered the natural and easy corridor between Yuhak-san and Ka-san at Ch'onp'yong-dong, leading into the Taegu basin. The battles in the Bowling Alley occurred south of this road junction.
Battle
Deadlock
The ROK 1st Infantry Division, with 7,500 men had held the line around the Bowling Alley since August 12. The Bowling Alley area was selected because of its advantageous high ground which provided natural barriers to funnel KPA troops into smaller fronts where ROK defenses could attack them from the high ground in concealed positions. In the meantime, the KPA 3rd, 13th, and 15th Divisions were advancing south and preparing to close on Taegu. The KPA 13th Division converged on the Tabu-dong corridor and a vicious melee ensued between the KPA and ROK troops, with ROK 1st Division's 11th, 12th and 13th Regiments committed against the KPA 13th Division's 19th, 21st and 23rd Regiments. The fight became a battle of attrition. As the two sides closed on one another, the battle took a brutal turn by August 15 as supplies ran low and units were locked in close quarters combat with little ammunition for the weapons. Fighting across the entire front became hand-to-hand combat and grenade fights at close range. The two divisions were so evenly matched that neither could make any appreciable gains for days of fighting and huge numbers of casualties.The bloody fighting obliged Paik to call for emergency reinforcements to hold the line. The Eighth Army responded immediately by sending the US 27th Infantry as well as the ROK 10th Regiment, 8th Division to reinforce the ROK 1st Division's three regiments. US Air Force aircraft also conducted a carpet bombing campaign against the advancing KPA positions to undetermined effect. Around that time the KPA 15th Division, which had been supporting the KPA 13th Division, withdrew from the front to attack elsewhere, leaving the ROK 1st Division, with the US 27th Infantry and the KPA 13th Division as principal opponents in the conflict that followed.
US infantry advance
As the 27th Infantry's trucks rolled northward from Tabu-dong and approached their Line of Departure, the men inside could see the KPA and ROK fighting on the ridges overlooking the road. The infantry dismounted and deployed an attacking line, with the 1st Battalion on the left of the road and the 2nd Battalion on the right. With US tanks leading the infantry on the road, the two battalions crossed the line at 13:00. The tanks opened fire against the mountain escarpments to aid the ROK infantry engaged there. The US infantry on either side of the road swept the lower hills, as the tanks on the road paced their advance with the infantry. A KPA outpost line in the valley withdrew and there was almost no KPA opposition during the first hour of the US advance. KPA outpost lines were in front of their main positions. The 27th Infantry had reached a point about north of Tabu-dong when Michaelis was informed that neither of the ROK regiments on the high ground flanking the valley road had been able to advance. He was ordered to halt and form a perimeter defense with both battalions astride the road.The two battalions of the 27th Infantry went into a perimeter defense just north of the village of Soi-ri. The 1st Battalion, on the left of the road, took a position with C Company on high ground in front, and with A Company on a ridge behind it. On their right, B Company was placed parallel to A Company, and carried the line across the stream and the narrow valley to the road. There the 2nd Battalion took up the defense line with E Company on the road and F Company on its right, while G Company held a ridge behind F Company. Thus, the two battalions presented a four-company front, with one company holding a refused flank position on either side. A platoon of tanks took positions on the front line, two tanks on the road and two in the stream bed, with four more tanks in reserve. The artillery went into firing positions behind the force. Six bazooka teams took up positions in front of the infantry positions along the road and in the stream bed. At the same time, the ROK 1st Division remained in control of the high ground on either side of the 27th Infantry positions.
August 18 attack
The first of seven successive KPA night attacks struck the 27th Infantry defensive perimeter shortly after dark that night, August 18. KPA mortars and artillery fired a heavy preparation for the general attack for several hours. Two T-34 tanks and an SU-76 self-propelled gun moved out of the village of Sinjumak in front of the 27th Infantry lines. Infantry followed them, some in trucks and others on foot. The lead tank moved slowly and without firing, apparently observing, while the second one and the SU-76 fired repeatedly into F Company's position. As the tanks drew near, a 3.5-inch bazooka team from F Company destroyed the second one in the line.Bazooka teams also hit the lead tank, causing its crew to abandon it. Fire from the 8th Field Artillery Battalion knocked out the self-propelled gun, destroyed two trucks, and killed or wounded an estimated 100 KPA troops at the point of the advance. US First Lieutenant Lewis Millett, an artillery forward observer and later a Medal of Honor winner after he transferred to the infantry, directed this artillery fire on the KPA, even as a T-34 tank approached within of his position. Three more T-34s had come down the road but, on realizing that the Americans had effective anti-tank weapons, they switched on their running lights and retreated north without engaging the UN troops. Around 00:30 on August 19 the first KPA attack had stalled and they withdrew. KPA troops made a second effort, much weaker than the first, around 02:30, but artillery and mortar fire dispersed them before they reached the UN lines.
Over the course of the next week, the US troops were able to discern the KPA system of attack and use it to their advantage. The KPA used a system of flares to signal various actions and coordinate them. It quickly became apparent to the defending Americans that green flares were used to signal an attack on a given area. So the 27th Infantry obtained its own green flares and then, after the KPA attack had begun, fired them over its main defensive positions. This confused the attacking forces and often drew them to the points of greatest US strength where they suffered massive casualties from defensive machine-gun crossfire. The US troops also began using land mines in front of their positions to stall the KPA. The mines stopped the tanks and the infantry tried to remove them. When this happened, US troops fired flares to illuminate the scene and pre-registered artillery and mortar fire blasted the immobilized KPA. This tactic was effective in inflicting further significant casualties.
Stalemate
On the morning of August 19, the ROK 11th and 13th Regiments launched counterattacks along the ridges with some gains, however the fight continued to produce heavy casualties for both sides. Walker ordered another reserve unit, a battalion of the ROK 10th Regiment, to the Taegu front to close a gap between the ROK 1st and 6th Divisions. Later in the day, Walker also ordered the US 23rd Infantry Regiment, under command of Colonel Paul L. Freeman, Jr., to move up and establish a defense perimeter around the 8th and 37th Field Artillery Battalions at their positions north of Taegu, to protect them from KPA attack. This was the only occasion during the war that two US regiments were assigned to a ROK command. The 3rd Battalion, 23rd Infantry took up a defensive position around the artillery while the 2nd Battalion occupied a defensive position on the road behind the 27th Infantry. The next day the two battalions exchanged places. ROK troops, suffering losses from the fighting, began recruiting students and civilians from nearby villages to fight.There was little fighting on the ground during the day on August 20. However, US aircraft attacked KPA positions around Taegu repeatedly during the day, often in close proximity to American ground forces. As night fell, KPA troops launched a second attack, firing a barrage of 120–mm. mortar shells into the 27th Infantry's Heavy Weapons Company area at 17:00; several of their tanks also began advancing down the corridor. The US troops responded with artillery and mortar fire, hitting the KPA column and its accompanying infantry. Waiting Americans held their small arms and machine gun fire until the KPA were within of their positions. The combined fire of all the US weapons repulsed this attack.
The next morning, August 21, a US patrol of two platoons of infantry and M26 Pershing tanks went up the road toward the KPA positions. White flags had appeared in front of the American line, and civilians in the area said many KPA wanted to surrender. The US patrol's mission was to investigate this situation and to form an estimate of KPA losses. The patrol advanced about, engaging small KPA groups and receiving some artillery fire. On its way it destroyed five disabled KPA tanks with thermite grenades. The patrol also found a 37 mm anti-tank gun, two SU-76 self-propelled guns, and a 120 mm mortar among the destroyed KPA equipment, as well as recognizing a large number of KPA dead. At the point of farthest advance, the patrol found and destroyed an abandoned T-34 tank in a village schoolhouse courtyard.
August 21 attack
That evening, the 27th Infantry placed two belts of antipersonnel mines and trip flares across the road and stream bed and in front of its positions in the valley. After dusk, the KPA began shelling the general area of the 27th Infantry positions until just before midnight. ROK troops had planned to mount an attack, but it became apparent that the KPA would hit first. Then the KPA 13th Division launched a major attack against the entire UN front in and around the valley. Nine US tanks supported the infantry troops in the valley. Because it was on higher ground and positioned in front of all the other American units, C Company on the left of the road usually was the first to detect an approaching attack. That evening the C Company commander telephoned the regimental headquarters that he could hear tanks. When the artillery fired an illuminating shell he was able to count 19 KPA vehicles in the attacking column on the road. The tanks and self-propelled guns approached the American positions, firing rapidly. Most of their shells landed in the rear areas. KPA infantry moved forward on both sides of the road. Simultaneously, other KPA units attacked the ROK troops on the high ridges flanking the valley.American artillery and mortar fire bombarded the KPA, trying to separate the tanks from the infantry. US machine gun fire opened on the KPA infantry only after they had entered the mine field and were at close range. The US M26 tanks in the front line held their fire until the KPA tanks came very close. One of the American tanks knocked out the lead KPA tank and a bazooka team from F Company knocked out a towed gun, the third vehicle in column. The trapped second tank was disabled by bazooka fire and abandoned by its crew. It was during this fight that the battle received its name. The US troops at the battle noted the tank shells being fired up and down the valley in the dark looked "like bowling balls."
Artillery and 90 mm tank fire destroyed seven more KPA T-34s, three more SU-76 towed guns, and several trucks and personnel carriers. This night battle, which was at times very intense, lasted about five hours. The US B Battery, 8th Field Artillery Battalion alone fired 1,661 105 mm rounds, the 4.2-inch mortar platoon fired 902 rounds, the 81 mm mortar platoon fired 1,200 rounds, and F Company, 27th Infantry fired 385 60 mm mortar rounds. The KPA column was completely destroyed. US patrols after daylight estimated the KPA had suffered 1,300 casualties in the fight. Eleven prisoners captured by the patrol said the action had decimated their units and that the division was only at 25 percent strength.
North Korean flanking moves
During the night battle, KPA forces infiltrated along the high ridge line around the east flank of the 27th Infantry and appeared the next day at about 12:00 in the rear of that regiment and only from Taegu. This force was a regiment of the KPA 1st Division and was 1,500 men strong. The regiment had just arrived from the Kunwi area to join in the battle for Taegu. It began ambushing supply lines to the American forces in the valley. One of the regiment's companies attacked the ROK 1st Division's headquarters with intent to capture Paik, but was repulsed by the ROK 10th Regiment.About this time, Michaelis sent an urgent message to Eighth Army saying that the ROK troops on his left had given way and that "those people are not fighting." One of the battalions of the ROK 11th Regiment had been driven back and was retreating in disarray. Prisoners told him that about 1,000 KPA were on his west flank. He asked for an air strike. Had these KPA troops been driven from this high ground, the perimeter position of the 27th Infantry Regiment would have been untenable. Paik bitterly resented Michaelis' charge that his men were not fighting, and in the argument, Eighth Army Korean Military Advisory Group advisers visited each ROK unit to ensure they were remaining in position. Paik personally rallied the ROK 11th Regiment for a charge back into its positions, impressing Michaelis. Later, Michaelis apologized to Paik though their relationship for the remainder of the battle remained strained.
On the afternoon of August 22, 2nd Battalion, 23rd Infantry, guarding the support artillery behind the 27th Infantry, came under attack by the KPA 1st Division troops that had passed around the forward positions. Freeman reported to Eighth Army at 16:40 that the KPA had shelled the rear battery of the 37th Field Artillery Battalion, that KPA infantry were between the US 27th and US 23rd Regiments on the road, and that other KPA groups had passed around the east side of his forward battalion. An intense artillery barrage began falling on the headquarters area of the 8th Field Artillery Battalion at 16:05, and 25 minutes later two direct hits destroyed the fire direction center, killing four officers and two non-commissioned officers. The individual batteries quickly took over control of the battalion fires and continued to support the infantry, while the battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Company withdrew under fire.
UN aircraft launched air strikes on the KPA-held ridge east of the road and on the valley beyond. That night, Walker released control of the 23rd Infantry, less the 1st Battalion, to the US 1st Cavalry Division with orders for it to clear the KPA from the road and the commanding ground overlooking the main supply route.
About 10:00, Lieutenant Colonel Chong Pong Uk, commanding the artillery regiment supporting the KPA 13th Division, walked up alone to a ROK 1st Division position north of Tabu-dong and defected. Chong, the highest ranking KPA prisoner of war thus far in the war, gave precise information on the location of his artillery. According to him, there were seven 122 mm howitzers and thirteen 76 mm guns emplaced and camouflaged in an orchard north of Tabu-dong, in a little valley on the north side of Yuhak-san. Upon receiving this information, Eighth Army immediately prepared to destroy the KPA weapons. Fighter-bombers attacked the orchard site with napalm, and US artillery took the location under fire. Chong was eventually commissioned in South Korea's armed forces.
Final moves
During the night of August 22–23, the KPA launched a weak attack against the 27th Infantry, which was quickly repulsed. Just before 12:00 on August 23, however, a violent action occurred some distance behind the front line when about 100 KPA soldiers, undetected, succeeded in reaching the positions of K Company, 27th Infantry and of the 1st Platoon, C Company, 65th Engineer Combat Battalion. They overran parts of these positions before being driven off and suffering 50 killed. Meanwhile, as ordered by Walker, the 2nd Battalion, 23rd Infantry, after repelling several KPA night attacks, counterattacked at dawn and seized the high ground overlooking the road at the artillery positions. At the same time the 3rd Battalion started an all-day attack that swept a stretch of high ground east of the road. This action largely cleared the KPA from the area behind and on the flanks of the 27th Infantry. At 13:35, Michaelis reported from the Bowling Alley to Eighth Army that the KPA 13th Division had blown the road to his front, had mined it, and was withdrawing.The next day, August 24, the 23rd Infantry continued clearing the rear areas and by night it estimated that there were fewer than 200 KPA behind the forward positions. The Bowling Alley front was quiet during the day. Shortly after midnight on August 24 the KPA launched what had by now become their regular nightly attack down the Bowling Alley. This attack was in an estimated two-company strength supported by a few tanks. The 27th Infantry broke up the attack and two more KPA tanks were destroyed by the supporting artillery fire. This was the last night the 27th Infantry Regiment spent in the Bowling Alley.
With the KPA turned back north of Taegu, Walker issued orders for the 27th Infantry to leave the Bowling Alley and return to the 25th Division in the Masan area. The ROK 1st Division was to assume responsibility for the Bowling Alley, but the 23rd Infantry was to remain north of Taegu in its support. ROK relief of the 27th Infantry began at 18:00, 25 August, and continued throughout the night until completed at 03:45 August 26. Survivors of the 1st Regiment, KPA 1st Division, joined the rest of that division in the mountains east of the Taegu–Sangju road near the walled summit of Ka-san. Prisoners reported that the 1st Regiment was down to about 400 men and had lost all its 120 mm mortars, 76 mm howitzers, and antitank guns as a result of its action on the east flank of the KPA 13th Division at the Bowling Alley.
Aftermath
The confirmed KPA losses from August 18 to 25 included 13 T-34 tanks, five SU-76 self-propelled guns, and 23 trucks. The KPA 13th Division's troops suffered heavy casualties during the fight, with an estimated 3,000 killed, wounded and captured. The division withdrew to rebuild. The North Koreans' total casualties from August 12 to 25 were 5,690 killed.US losses during the battle were extremely light; unusual for fighting at a time in which other UN offensive forces were paying a heavy price when making similar pushes against the KPA. The US infantry forces suffered only five killed and 54 wounded in the 27th Infantry, plus three killed and 16 wounded in the 23rd Infantry. This brought the total US casualty count to 8 dead, 70 wounded. ROK troops suffered much more heavily during the fight. An estimated 2,300 soldiers were killed in the fighting; 2,244 enlisted men and 56 officers. However, these losses were not crippling, as volunteers poured in from the surrounding countryside to fight for the ROK.