British entry into World War I


Great Britain entered World War I on 4 August 1914 when the king declared war after the expiration of an ultimatum to Germany. The official explanation focused on protecting Belgium as a neutral country; the main reason, however, was to prevent a French defeat that would have left Germany in control of Western Europe.

Background

For much of the 19th century, Britain pursued a policy later known as splendid isolation, which sought to maintain the balance of power in Europe without formal alliances. As Europe divided into two power blocs during the 1890s, the 1895-1905 Conservative government realised this left Britain dangerously exposed. This resulted in the 1902 Anglo-Japanese Alliance, followed by King Edward VII's 1903 visit to Paris. By reducing anti-British feeling in France, it led to the 1904 Entente Cordiale, the first tangible impact of which was British support for France against Germany in the 1905 Moroccan Crisis.
In 1907, the new Liberal government agreed the Anglo-Russian Convention. Like the Entente, the Convention focused on resolving colonial disputes but by doing so, paved the way for wider co-operation and allowed Britain to refocus its naval resources in response to German naval expansion.
The 1911 Agadir Crisis encouraged secret military negotiations between France and Britain in the case of war with Germany. A British Expeditionary Force of 100,000 men would be landed in France within two weeks of war, while naval arrangements allocated responsibility for the Mediterranean to France, with the Royal Navy looking after the North Sea and the Channel, including Northern France. Britain was effectively bound to support France in a war against Germany regardless but this was not widely understood outside government or the military.

Antagonism with Germany

In explaining why Britain went to war with Germany, British historian Paul Kennedy recognised it was critical for war that Germany become economically more powerful than Britain, but he downplays the disputes over economic trade imperialism, the Baghdad Railway, confrontations in Eastern Europe, high-charged political rhetoric and domestic pressure-groups. Germany's reliance time and again on sheer power, while Britain increasingly appealed to moral sensibilities, played a role, especially in seeing the invasion of Belgium as a necessary military tactic or a profound moral crime. The German invasion of neutral Belgium was not important because the British decision had already been made and the British were more concerned with the fate of France. Kennedy argues that by far the main reason was London's fear that a repeat of 1870, when Prussia and the German states smashed France, would mean that Germany, with a powerful army and navy, would control the English Channel and northwest France. British policy-makers insisted that that would be a catastrophe for British security.
Christopher Clark points out that the British cabinet decided on July 29, 1914, that being a signatory to the 1839 treaty about Belgium did not obligate it to oppose a German invasion of Belgium with military force.

Decision for war

Immediately after the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand at Sarajevo on 28 June, British newspapers denounced the killer Gavrilo Prìncip and were generally sympathetic to the Habsburg monarchy. The papers blamed Serbia with rhetoric against "fanatics", "dangerous forces" and "reckless agitators". These responses included the political spectrum as Liberal and Conservative papers expressed their shock and dismay. By 27 July, press opinion had turned against Austria-Hungary. The national press divided on party lines. Conservative papers stressing the obligation to support France. Liberal papers insisted Britain had no such commitment and should remain neutral.
As Germany and Russia became central players British leaders increasingly had a sense of commitment to defending France against Germany. Firstly, if Germany again conquered France as had happened in the Franco-Prussian War, it would become a major threat to British economic, political and cultural interests. Secondly, partisanship was involved. The Liberal Party was identified with internationalism and free trade, and opposition to jingoism and warfare. By contrast the Conservative Party was identified as the party of nationalism and patriotism; Britons expected it "to show capacity in running a war." Liberal voters demanded peace, but they also were outraged when the Germans treated Belgian neutrality as a worthless "scrap of paper". Germany, en route to a massive attack on France, invaded Belgium early on the morning of 4 August. The victims called upon Britain for military rescue under the 1839 treaty and in response, London gave Berlin an ultimatum which expired at 11pm London time, which was ignored. The king declared war on Germany that evening.
Before war was declared, newspapers gave extensive coverage but ranged widely in recommended policy recommendations from peace to war. C. P. Scott and the Manchester Guardian maintained an intense campaign against war. It denounced a "conspiracy to drag us into a war against England’s interests", arguing that it would amount to a "crime against Europe" and warning that it would "throw away the accumulated progress of half a century". David Lloyd George told Scott on Tuesday 4 August 1914, "Up until last Sunday only two members of the Cabinet had been in favour of our intervention in the war but the violation of Belgian territory had completely altered the situation". According to Isabel V. Hull:
Once war was declared defence of Belgium rather than France was the public reason given for war. Propaganda posters emphasized that Britain was required to safeguard Belgium's neutrality under the 1839 Treaty of London.
As late as 1 August 1914, the great majority of Liberals—both voters and cabinet members—strongly opposed going to war. The German invasion of Belgium was such an outrageous violation of international rights that Liberals agreed for war on August 4. Historian Zara Steiner says:
The Liberals succeeded in mending their deep division over warfare. Unless the Liberal government acted decisively against the German invasion of France, its top leaders including Prime Minister H. H. Asquith, Foreign Minister Edward Grey, First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill and others would resign, leading to a risk that the much more pro-war Conservative Party might form a government. Mistreatment of Belgium was not itself a fundamental cause of British entry, but it was used extensively as a justification in wartime propaganda to motivate the British people.
The German high command was aware that entering Belgium could trigger British intervention but decided the risk was acceptable; they expected it to be a short war while their ambassador in London claimed civil war in Ireland would prevent Britain from assisting France.
Historians looking at the July crisis typically conclude that Grey:

Irish crisis on hold

Until late July, British politics was totally focused on the threat of civil war in Ireland. In 1912 the government had presented a Home Rule bill that Irish nationalists demanded; under the terms of the Parliament Act 1911, by which the House of Lords retained the right to delay legislation by up to two years, it was due to become law in 1914. The Ulster Protestants demanded separate treatment; by 1914 the government was offering a six-year opt-out to the six counties which would eventually become Northern Ireland, but not the permanent exemption which they demanded. Both sides in Ireland had smuggled in weapons, set up militias with tens of thousands of volunteers, were drilling, and were ready to fight a civil war. The British Army itself was paralyzed: during the Curragh Incident officers threatened to resign or accept dismissal rather than obey orders to deploy into Ulster. Elements of the Unionist Party supported them. On 25 July the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia became known, and the cabinet realized that war with Germany was increasingly likely. The Government of Ireland Act 1914 was enacted into law, but was suspended for the duration of hostilities, with the issue of Ulster still unresolved. Grey told Parliament on 3 August "The one bright spot in the whole of this terrible situation is Ireland. The general feeling throughout Ireland, and I would like this to be clearly understood abroad, does not make that a consideration that we feel we have to take into account."

Empire at war

The king's declaration of war automatically involved all dominions and colonies and protectorates of the British Empire, many of whom made significant contributions to the Allied war effort, both in the provision of troops and civilian labourers.

Historiography