COVID-19 apps
COVID-19 apps are mobile software applications that use Digital contact tracing in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, i.e. the process of identifying persons who may have been in contact with an infected individual.
Numerous applications were developed or proposed, with official government support in some territories and jurisdictions. Several frameworks for building contact tracing apps have been developed. Privacy concerns have been raised, especially about systems that are based on tracking the geographical location of app users.
Less intrusive alternatives include the use of Bluetooth signals to log a user's proximity to other cellphones. On 10 April 2020, Google and Apple jointly announced that they would integrate functionality to support such Bluetooth-based apps directly into their Android and iOS operating systems. India's Covid-19 tracking app Aarogya Setu became the world's fastest growing application beating Pokemon Go with 50 million users in the first 13 days of its release.
Rationale
Contact tracing is an important tool in infectious disease control, but as the number of cases rises time constraints make it more challenging to effectively control transmission. Digital contact tracing, especially if widely deployed, may be more effective than traditional methods of contact tracing. In a March 2020 model by the Oxford University Big Data Institute team of Professor Christophe Fraser, a coronavirus outbreak in a city of one million people is halted if 80% of all smartphone users take part in a tracking system; in the model, the elderly are still expected to self-isolate en masse, but individuals who are neither symptomatic nor elderly are exempt from isolation unless they receive an alert that they are at risk of carrying the disease. Some proponents advocate for legislation exempting certain COVID-19 apps from general privacy restrictions.Issues
Uptake
, professor of security engineering at Cambridge University, listed a number of potential practical problems with app-based systems, including false positives and the potential lack of effectiveness if takeup of the app is limited to only a small fraction of the population. In Singapore, only one person in three downloaded the TraceTogether App by end-June 2020, despite legal requirements for most workers; the app was also underused due to the fact that it required users to keep the app open at all times on Apple iOS.The proposed Google/Apple contact tracing plan intends to mitigate the take-up problem by incorporating the tracing mechanism in their device operating systems, distributed by standard software update mechanisms. By phase two, the operating system would be able to track exposure without the need to download a separate COVID-19 app.
A team at the University of Oxford simulated the effect of a contact tracing app on a city of 1 million. They estimated that if the app was used in conjunction with the shielding of over-70s, then 56% of the population would have to be using the app for it to suppress the virus. This would be equivalent to 80% of smartphone users in the United Kingdom. They found that the app could still slow the spread of the virus if fewer people downloaded it, with one infection being prevented for every one or two users.
App store restrictions
Addressing concerns about the spread of misleading or harmful apps, Apple, Google and Amazon set limits on which types of organizations could add coronavirus-related apps to its App Store, limiting them to only "official" or otherwise reputable organizations.Privacy, discrimination and marginalisation concerns
Privacy campaigners voiced their concern regarding the implications of mass surveillance using coronavirus apps, in particular about whether surveillance infrastructure created to deal with the coronavirus pandemic will be dismantled once the threat has passed. American Civil Liberties Union has published a set of principles for technology-assisted contact tracing and Amnesty International and over 100 other organizations issued a statement calling for limits on this kind of surveillance. The organisations declared eight conditions on governmental projects:- surveillance would have to be "lawful, necessary and proportionate";
- extensions of monitoring and surveillance would have to have sunset clauses;
- the use of data would have to be limited to COVID-19 purposes;
- data security and anonymity would have to be protected and shown to be protected based on evidence;
- digital surveillance would have to address the risk of exacerbating discrimination and marginalisation;
- any sharing of data with third parties would have to be defined in law;
- there would have to be safeguards against abuse and the rights of citizens to respond to abuses;
- "meaningful participation" by all "relevant stakeholders" would be required, including that of public health experts and marginalised groups.
The proposed Google/Apple contact tracing plan intends to address the problem of persistent surveillance by removing the tracing mechanism from their device operating systems once it is no longer needed.
On 20 April 2020, it was reported that over 300 academics had signed a statement favouring decentralised proximity tracing applications over centralised models, given the difficulty in precluding centralised options being used "to enable unwarranted discrimination and surveillance." In a centralised model, a central database records the ID codes of meetings between users. In a decentralised model, this information is recorded on individual phones, with the role of the central database being limited to identifying phones by their ID code when an alert needs to be sent.
Human Rights Watch suggests that national mobile applications for COVID-19 contact tracing could potentially pose a serious threat to human rights.
In May 2020, it was reported that the authorities in Moscow wrongly fined hundreds of Moscovites for breaching self-quarantine. The dubious behavioral interpretations recorded by the social monitoring tracking application led to the mistaken fining of hundreds of people in Moscow.
Accuracy of proximity reports
According to ZDNet, Bluetooth-based proximity detection carries a risk of over-reporting interactions and leading to "a huge amount of false positives"; hypothetically, a system could flag an interaction with " person waiting for the bus on the side of the road". One problem is that using Bluetooth signal strength to infer distance can be unreliable; the range of a given Bluetooth device can vary due to the environment or the way the device is held. False positives could result in needless self-isolation, or could cause users to ignore warnings if the warnings are perceived as unreliable. GPS-based proximity detection can also be unreliable: according to the United States' GPS.gov, "GPS-enabled smartphones are typically accurate to within a 4.9 meter radius under open sky", with accuracy decreasing further in the presence of signal blockage. In contrast, social distancing guidelines are usually 2 m.In the Google/Apple mechanism, a log entry is only added on the phone if Bluetooth proximity persists for five minutes. Logs are retained for 14 days. Bluetooth tracking is prone to false negatives; for example, unlike time-stamped GPS matching, Bluetooth cannot detect that a user has entered a possibly-infected space that an infected person has just left.
General approaches
Centralized contact tracing
Some countries used network-based location tracking instead of apps, eliminating both the need to download an app and the ability to avoid tracking. In Israel, network-based tracking was approved. Network-based solutions that have access to raw location data have significant potential privacy problems. However, not all systems with central servers need to have access to personal location data; a number of privacy-preserving systems have been created that use central servers only for intercommunication.In South Korea, a non-app-based system was used to perform contact tracing. Instead of using a dedicated app, the system gathered tracking information from a variety of sources including mobile device tracking data and card transaction data, and combined these to generate notices via text messages to potentially-infected individuals. In addition to using this information to alert potential contacts, the government has also made the location information publicly available, something permitted because of far-reaching changes to information privacy laws after the MERS outbreak in that country. This information is available to the public via a number of apps and websites.
Countries including Germany considered using both centralized and privacy-preserving systems., the details had not yet been released.
Decentralized contact tracing
Privacy-preserving contact tracing is a well-established concept, with a substantial body of research literature dating back to at least 2013.As of 7 April 2020, over a dozen expert groups were working on privacy-friendly solutions, such as using Bluetooth Low Energy to log a user's proximity to other cellphones. Users then receive a message if they've been in close contact with someone who has tested positive for COVID-19.
A group of European researchers, including from the Fraunhofer Heinrich Hertz Institute and École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, were under the umbrella of the Pan-European Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing project, developing a BLE-based app to serve this purpose that is designed to avoid the need for intrusive surveillance by the state. However, PEPP-PT is a co-ordination effort which contains both centralised and decentralised approaches. On April 17, 2020, EPFL and the ETH Zurich pulled out of the project, criticizing PEPP-PT for a lack of transparency and openness, and for not respecting personal privacy enough. Later it was reported that KU Leuven, the CISPA Helmholz Center for Information Security, the European Laboratory for Learning and Intelligent Systems and the Technical University of Denmark, also withdrew from the project. On April 26, 2020, Germany switched to decentralised approach to support solutions like DP-3T.
Decentralised protocols include Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing, The Coalition Network's Whisper Tracing Protocol, the global TCN Coalition's TCN Protocol, and the MIT Media Lab's SafePaths. The goal of decentralization is to reduce the loss of privacy, by exchanging anonymous keys that do not include identifiable information.
COCOVID is being developed as a common effort of several European companies and institutions. The Mobile Application, the Big Data and the Artificial Intelligence components will be available to any government. The COCOVID app is Open Source and the backend is based on a highly scalable solution that is already used by several of the largest financial institutions in Europe. COCOVID will support the coordination of tests at medical institutions, allowing users with a high infection risk to book a test slot directly from the app. This will reduce the effort and increase the efficiency of the medical test processes. COCOVID will use both location and Bluetooth contact data, allowing a high level of effectiveness. The solution is designed following the EU data privacy recommendations.
The team working on the project includes persons from Orange, Ericsson, Proventa AG, Stratio, TH Köln and Charta digitale Vernetzung.
On 9 April 2020, the Singaporean government announced that it had open-sourced a reference implementation of the BlueTrace protocol used by its official government app.
Google / Apple Exposure Notification protocol
On 10 April 2020, Google and Apple, the companies that control the Android and iOS mobile platforms, announced an initiative for contact tracing, which they stated would preserve privacy, based on a combination of Bluetooth Low Energy technology and privacy-preserving cryptography. They also published specifications of the core technologies used in the system. According to Apple and Google, the system is intended to be rolled out in three stages:- API specification and publication
- rollout of tools to enable governments to create official privacy-preserving coronavirus tracing apps
- integration of this functionality directly into iOS and Android
The ACLU stated the Google and Apple's approach "appears to mitigate the worst privacy and centralization risks, but there is still room for improvement".
By 20 April 2020, Google and Apple described the systems as "Exposure Notification" rather than "contact tracing", stating the system should be "in service of broader contact tracing efforts by public health authorities". The name change was received positively by journalists in Vox/Recode and Salon, who stated "Exposure notification schemes like the Apple-Google system aren't true contact tracing systems because they don't allow public health authorities to identify people who have been exposed to infected individuals."
List of frameworks
List of countries with official contact tracing apps
;Australia;Austria
;Azerbaijan
;Bahrain
;Bangladesh
;China
;Colombia
;Croatia
;Czech Republic
;Denmark
;France
;Germany
;Ghana
;Hungary
;Iceland
;India
;Ireland
;Israel
;Italy
;Japan
;Jordan
;Latvia
;Malaysia
;Nepal
;New Zealand
;North Macedonia
;Norway
;Qatar
;Saudi Arabia
;Singapore
;Spain
;Switzerland
Countries considering deployment
Centralized approaches
In the United Kingdom, Matthew Gould, chief executive of NHSX, the government body responsible for policy regarding technology in the NHS, said in late March 2020 that the organisation was looking seriously at an app that would alert people if they had recently been in contact with someone testing positive for the virus after scientists advising the government suggested it "could play a critical role" in limiting lockdowns. On 22 April, the government announced that alpha testing of a prototype of the app was in progress at RAF Leeming. Beta testing began on the Isle of Wight on 5 May for council staff and NHS workers before a wider rollout to all residents on 7 May. By 15 May, over 72,000 had downloaded the app, equivalent to more than half of the island's population.On June 18, following reports that the app was only detecting 75% of contacts on Android devices and 4% of contacts on iPhones, the UK government announced that it would cease the development of its centralized system, and move to a decentralized system based on the Apple/Google Exposure Notification system.
Decentralized approaches
Both Australia and New Zealand are considering apps based on Singapore's TraceTogether app and BlueTrace protocol as of April 2020.Many countries have announced the official development, trial or adoption of decentralized proximity tracing systems, where the matching of proximity encounters happens locally on individuals' devices, such as the Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing protocol or the Google-Apple Exposure Notification API. These include Austria, Switzerland, Estonia, Latvia, Canada, Italy, Germany, Finland, the Netherlands, Ireland and Denmark.
In the United States, as of 10 June 2020, three states, Alabama, South Carolina, and North Dakota, have committed to using the Google-Apple Exposure Notification API. The U.S. state of Arizona is testing the Covid Watch app developed with the Apple/Google protocol. At least nineteen states have not yet decided, and at least seventeen other states stated there were no plans to use smartphone-based contact tracing.
Geofencing
intends to introduce a geofencing app for patients diagnosed with COVID-19 living in Moscow, designed to ensure they do not leave home.List of apps by country
Note: This table should list only apps which are either supported by citations from third-party reliable sources, or are from, or supported by, independently notable organizations such as national governments, industrial collaborations, major universities or NGOs, or one of the framework collaborations listed above.| Country | Name | Functionality | Platform | Author/supporter | Status | Licence | Protocol | Homepage | Downloads | Ref |
| COVID-19 AO | self diagnostic, information and quarantine enforcement | Web | Ravelino de Castro | Proprietary | https://covid19ao.com/ | |||||
| Coronavirus Australia | information, isolation registration | Android, iOS | Delv Pty Ltd / Australian Department of Health | in use | Proprietary | 27/04, 1.89 million; 26/04: 1 million | ||||
| COVIDSafe | contact tracing | Android, iOS | Australian Department of Health | in use | Proprietary | BlueTrace | 07/05, 4 million | |||
| contact tracing, medical reporting | Android, iOS | Austrian Red Cross | in use | Apache License 2.0 | DP-3T | |||||
| The Spread Project | contact tracing, medical reporting | Android, iOS | Manoel Lemos | APK file released | Proprietary | |||||
| COVID Alert | contact tracing | Android, iOS | Shopify, Blackberry, Canadian Government | in use | Apache License 2.0 | Google / Apple privacy-preserving tracing project | http://www.canada.ca/en/public-health/services/diseases/coronavirus-disease-covid-19/covid-alert.html | |||
| "Alipay Health Code" | contact tracing | Android, iOS | integrated into Alipay and WeChat apps | Proprietary | ||||||
| eRouška | contact tracing | Android, iOS | Czech Ministry of Health and Hygiene | in use | MIT License | own | ||||
| contact tracing | Android, iOS | Ministry of Health | in use | Proprietary | Google / Apple privacy-preserving tracing project | |||||
| Ketju | contact tracing | Android, iOS | 2M-IT, Futurice, Reaktor Finland, Fractal, Sitra | small pilot test in May | unknown | DP-3T | ||||
| contact tracing | Android, iOS | Government of France / INRIA, ANNSI, Cap Gemini, Dassault Systèmes, INSERM, Lunabee studio, Orange, Santé publique France, Withings, Coalition Network | in use since 2 June 2020 | MPL-2.0 and ad hoc | ROBERT | |||||
| ROBERT | contact tracing | unknown | INRIA | PEPP-PT | , | |||||
| Stop Covid | contact tracing | Android, iOS | Novid20 / Georgian Ministry of Health | in use | GPL | PEPP-PT | ||||
| Ito | contact tracing | Android | like TUM | APK file released | GPL3 | TCN | ||||
| OHIOH Framework | contact tracing, scientific research | Android, OS | FH Kiel] | APK file released | MIT | TCN | ||||
| Corona-Warn-App | contact tracing | Android & Apple | Robert Koch Institute | published | Apache License | Google / Apple privacy-preserving tracing project | https://coronawarn.app/ | 17/06: 6.5m, 18/06: 8m, 20/06: 10.6m, 25/06: 13.0m, 02/07: 14.4m | ||
| DOCANDU Covid Checker | self diagnostic, information and 24/7 online doctor | Android, Web-based / Web-site Widget | DOCANDU, Region of Attica, Athens Medical Association | in use | https://www.docandu.com/en | 27/04, 18,000 users | ||||
| GH COVID-19 Tracker App | Android, iOS: awaiting app store approvals | Ministry of Communication and Technology, Ministry of Health | ||||||||
| Stay Home Safe | quarantine enforcement | Unknown | The Government Of The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region | Unknown | ||||||
| VírusRadar | contact tracing | Android, iOS | Ministry of Innovation and Technology and NextSense | in use | https://virusradar.hu | |||||
| Rakning C-19 | route tracking | Android, IOS | Iceland's Department of Civil Protection and Emergency Management and Directorate of Health | in use | MIT License | GPS | https://www.covid.is/app/en | 26/04, 50% | ||
| Aarogya Setu | contact tracing | Android, iOS | Union Government of India / National Informatics Centre | 50million + | ||||||
| COVA Punjab | contact tracing | Android, iOS | Government of Punjab | |||||||
| COVID-19 Feedback | feedback | Android | Union Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology / Union Ministry of Health and Family Welfare | |||||||
| COVID-19 Quarantine Monitor | contact tracing, geofencing | TBA | Government of Tamil Nadu / Pixxon AI Solutions | |||||||
| Corona Kavach | information | Android | Union Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology / Union Ministry of Health and Family Welfare | |||||||
| GoK Direct | information | Android, iOS | Government of Kerala / Qkopy, MuseON Communications | Proprietary | ||||||
| Mahakavach | contact tracing | Android | Government of Maharashtra | |||||||
| Quarantine Watch | contact tracing | Android | Government of Karnataka | |||||||
| Test Yourself Goa | self diagnostic | Android | Government of Goa / Innovaccer | |||||||
| Trackcovid-19.org | self diagnostic, syndromic surveillance | Web | Trackcovid-19.org | In Use | Open | https://www.trackcovid-19.org/ | NA | |||
| Test Yourself Puducherry | self diagnostic | Android | Government of Puducherry / Innovaccer | |||||||
| PeduliLindungi | contact tracing | Android, Apple | Indonesian Ministry of Communication and Information Technology | in use | https://pedulilindungi.id/ | |||||
| contact tracing, health info | Android, iOS | in use | MIT License | Bluetooth Exposure Notification | https://covidtracker.gov.ie https://github.com/HSEIreland/covid-tracker-app | |||||
| Hamagen | contact tracing | Android, iOS | Israeli Health Ministry | in use, open source | MIT License | https://govextra.gov.il/ministry-of-health/hamagen-app/download-en/ | ||||
| Covid Community Alert | CovidApp for citizens, CovidDoc for doctors, web dashboard for epidemiologists | Android, iOS, web | Coronavirus Outbreak Control | Released | Open source, unclear | TCN | https://coronavirus-outbreak-control.github.io/web/ | |||
| diAry “Digital Arianna” | GPS location tracing, exposure notification, awareness raising | Android, iOS | University of Urbino / DIGIT srl | Released, open beta | MIT License | GPS, own | https://covid19app.uniurb.it/ | |||
| contact tracing | Android, iOS | Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri | Released | GNU AGPLv3 | Google / Apple privacy-preserving tracing project | https://www.immuni.italia.it/ | ||||
| SM-COVID-19 | Contact Tracing | Android, iOS | SoftMining | Released | Closed source, private specifications | |||||
| COVID-19 Contact-Confirming Application | Contact Tracing | Android, iOS | Released | Proprietary Core: MPL 2.0 | Google / Apple privacy-preserving tracing project | https://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/seisakunitsuite/bunya/cocoa_00138.html | ||||
| AMAN | Exposure Detection | Android, iOS | Jordan's Ministry of Health | Released | GPS | 600,000 | ||||
| Apturi Covid | Exposure Detection | Android, iOS | Consortium of volunteers, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Latvia | Released | ||||||
| Gerak Malaysia | contact tracing, border crossing registration | Android, iOS | Royal Malaysia Police / Ministry of Health | Discontinued as of July 31, 2020 | Proprietary | 1 million | ||||
| MySejahtera | information | Android, iOS | National Security Council / Ministry of Health | In use | Proprietary | QR code | ||||
| MyTrace | contact tracing | Android, iOS | MOSTI | In use | Proprietary | Bluetooth | ||||
| SELangkah | Contact tracing | Android, iOS | Government of Selangor | In use, integrated with MySejahtera and Maybank app | Proprietary | QR code | https://www.selangkah.my/web/ | |||
| Wiqaytna | contact tracing | Android, iOS | Ministry of Interior | In use | GNU GPLv3 compatible with open source OpenTrace | Bluetooth | ||||
| PrivateTracer | contact tracing | Android, iOS | Milvum, YES!Delft, Odyssey, Hague | MIT Licence | DP-3T | |||||
| COVIRA | Individual and regional risk assessment | web | Science Hub | In use | GNU GPLv3 compatible with open source OpenTrace | |||||
| NZ COVID Tracer | Point-of-interest journal | Android, iOS | Ministry of Health | in use | Proprietary | QR code | https://tracing.covid19.govt.nz/ | May 20 | ||
| StopKorona! | contact tracing | Android, iOS | Ministry of Health, Nextsense | Proprietary | ||||||
| Smittestopp | contact tracing, route tracking | Android, iOS | Simula Research Laboratory / Norwegian Institute of Public Health | in use | Proprietary | https://helsenorge.no/smittestopp | April 20, 1.2m | |||
| ProteGO Safe | contact tracing, medical reporting, information | Android, iOS | authors: Jakub Lipinski, Karol Kostrzewa, Dariusz Aniszewski; supporter: Ministry of Digital Affairs of Poland | in use | GNU GPLv3 + GNU AGPLv3 | Google / Apple privacy-preserving tracing project | ||||
| "Social Monitoring" | contact tracing | under development | Infogorod / Gaskar | |||||||
| Contact Tracer | Digital Contact Tracing and Alerting | Android | SoftTree | https://contacttracer.ru | ||||||
| Corona Map | Self Diagnostic Information | Android, iOS, Web | National Health Information Center | in use | https://coronamap.sa/ | |||||
| Tabaud - تباعد | Contact Tracing | iOS | Saudi Data and Artificial Intelligence Authority | in use | Google / Apple privacy-preserving tracing project | |||||
| TraceTogether | contact tracing | Android, iOS | Government Digital Services agency of Government Technology Agency of Singapore | in use | compatible with open source OpenTrace / BlueTrace framework | BlueTrace | https://www.tracetogether.gov.sg/ | 18/06 2m, 15/5 1.4m, 27/4 1.1m, 9/4 1000k, 2/4 950k, 30/3 910k, 27/03 830k, 26/03 735k, 22/3 600k, 21/03 500k users | ||
| Corona 100m | contact tracing | Android | Bae Won-Seok / TINA3D | |||||||
| Self-Diagnosis app | self-diagnostic | Android, iOS | Ministry of Health and Welfare | |||||||
| Self-Quarantine app | isolation registration | Android, iOS | Ministry of the Interior and Safety | |||||||
| Covi-ID | contact tracing, health credential management | Android, iOS, Web | Council for Scientific and Industrial Research,University of Cape Town, The Delta Studio | in use | compatible with open source | PACT,GDPR,California Consumer Privacy Act, POPI | https://coviid.me/ | |||
| Radar COVID | contact tracing | Android, iOS | Ministry of Economic Affairs and Digital Transformation, Indra Sistemas | Available in Play Store and App Store | DP-3T, Google / Apple privacy-preserving tracing project | , | ||||
| Self Shield | Self-Health Checking and monitoring, AI driven breathing performance assessment, Quarantine Monitoring and Support, reporting test state, demographic mapping | Android | Commonwealth Centre for Digital Health | Available in Play Store | Proprietary | https://sshield.org | ||||
| contact tracing | Android, iOS | Ubique, EPFL, ETH Zurich | in use | MPL 2.0 | DP-3T, Google / Apple privacy-preserving tracing project | https://github.com/DP-3T/dp3t-app-android-ch | ||||
| COVID Symptom Study, formerly Covid Symptom Tracker | self-diagnostic | Android, iOS | King's College London, Guy's and St Thomas' Hospitals, Zoe Global Limited | https://covid.joinzoe.com/ | May 4, 3 million | |||||
| NHS COVID-19 | multipurpose | Android, iOS | Pivotal Software for NHSX | MIT License | ||||||
| self-diagnostic | Web | Apple Inc. / U.S. Federal Government | ||||||||
| CovidSafe | self-diagnostic, contact tracing | Android, iOS | Microsoft volunteers, University of Washington | MIT License | PACT | https://covidsafe.cs.washington.edu/ | ||||
| Covid Watch | exposure alerts / anonymous contact tracing | Android, iOS | Covid Watch | piloting | Apache 2.0 | Google / Apple privacy-preserving tracing project, TCN | ||||
| coEpi | self-reporting | Android, iOS | coEpi | TCN | https://www.coepi.org | > | ||||
| How We Feel | self-diagnostic | Android, iOS | Pinterest and others | |||||||
| NOVID | contact tracing | Android, iOS | , CMU | TCN | ||||||
| Preworkscreen | Employee pre-shift screening, reporting, and documenting | Android, iOS, Web | Released on and | Proprietary | ||||||
| Private Kit: Safe Paths | contact tracing | Android, iOS | MIT | MIT License | ||||||
| TeamSense | Employee pre-shift symptom screening, reporting and compliance dashboard | Web | TeamSense | In Use | Proprietary | https://www.teamsense.com | ||||
| ProjectCovid | self diagnostic, information | Android, iOS | LFR International | Released | https://project-covid.lfrinternational.org/ | |||||
| NCOVI | medical reporting | Android, iOS | VNPT, Ministry of Health Vietnam | Proprietary | ||||||
| Bluezone | contact tracing | Android, iOS | Ministry of Health Vietnam | Available in Play Store | Licence GNU License | |||||
| global | World Health Organization COVID-19 App | information | Android, iOS | World Health Organization | under development | MIT Licence | ||||
| global | Coalition App | contact tracing | Android, iOS, third party hardware | Coalition Network | Live | GPL 3 | Whisper Tracing Protocol | https://www.coalitionnetwork.org/ |