History of the function concept


The mathematical concept of a function emerged in the 17th century in connection with the development of the calculus; for example, the slope of a graph at a point was regarded as a function of the x-coordinate of the point. Functions were not explicitly considered in antiquity, but some precursors of the concept can perhaps be seen in the work of medieval philosophers and mathematicians such as Oresme.
Mathematicians of the 18th century typically regarded a function as being defined by an analytic expression. In the 19th century, the demands of the rigorous development of analysis by Weierstrass and others, the reformulation of geometry in terms of analysis, and the invention of set theory by Cantor, eventually led to the much more general modern concept of a function as a single-valued mapping from one set to another.

Functions before the 17th century

Already in the 12th century, mathematician Sharaf al-Din al-Tusi analyzed the equation in the form stating that the left hand side must at least equal the value of for the equation to have a solution. He then determined the maximum value of this expression. It is arguable that the isolation of this expression is an early approach to the notion of a "function". A value less than means no positive solution; a value equal to corresponds to one solution, while a value greater than corresponds to two solutions. Sharaf al-Din's analysis of this equation was a notable development in Islamic mathematics, but his work was not pursued any further at that time, neither in the Muslim world nor in Europe.
According to Dieudonné and Ponte, the concept of a function emerged in the 17th century as a result of the development of analytic geometry and the infinitesimal calculus. Nevertheless, Medvedev suggests that the implicit concept of a function is one with an ancient lineage. Ponte also sees more explicit approaches to the concept in the Middle Ages:
The development of analytical geometry around 1640 allowed mathematicians to go between geometric problems about curves and algebraic relations between "variable coordinates x and y." Calculus was developed using the notion of variables, with their associated geometric meaning, which persisted well into the eighteenth century. However, the terminology of "function" came to be used in interactions between Leibniz and Bernoulli towards the end of the 17th century.

The notion of "function" in analysis

The term "function" was literally introduced by Gottfried Leibniz, in a 1673 letter, to describe a quantity related to points of a curve, such as a coordinate or curve's slope.
Johann Bernoulli started calling expressions made of a single variable "functions."
In 1698, he agreed with Leibniz that any quantity formed "in an algebraic and transcendental manner" may be called a function of x.
By 1718, he came to regard as a function "any expression made up of a variable and some constants." Alexis Claude Clairaut and Leonhard Euler introduced the familiar notation for the value of a function.
The functions considered in those times are called today differentiable functions. For this type of function, one can talk about limits and derivatives; both are measurements of the output or the change in the output as it depends on the input or the change in the input. Such functions are the basis of calculus.

Euler

In the first volume of his fundamental text Introductio in Analysin Infinitorum, published in 1748, Euler gave essentially the same definition of a function as his teacher Bernoulli, as an expression or formula involving variables and constants e.g.,. Euler's own definition reads:
Euler also allowed multi-valued functions whose values are determined by an implicit equation.
In 1755, however, in his Institutiones Calculi Differentialis, Euler gave a more general concept of a function:
Medvedev considers that "In essence this is the definition that became known as Dirichlet's definition." Edwards also credits Euler with a general concept of a function and says further that

Fourier

In his Théorie Analytique de la Chaleur, Fourier claimed that an arbitrary function could be represented by a Fourier series. Fourier had a general conception of a function, which included functions that were neither continuous nor defined by an analytical expression. Related questions on the nature and representation of functions, arising from the solution of the wave equation for a vibrating string, had already been the subject of dispute between d'Alembert and Euler, and they had a significant impact in generalizing the notion of a function. Luzin observes that:

Cauchy

During the 19th century, mathematicians started to formalize all the different branches of mathematics. One of the first to do so was Cauchy; his somewhat imprecise results were later made completely rigorous by Weierstrass, who advocated building calculus on arithmetic rather than on geometry, which favoured Euler's definition over Leibniz's. According to Smithies, Cauchy thought of functions as being defined by equations involving real or complex numbers, and tacitly assumed they were continuous:

Lobachevsky and Dirichlet

and Peter Gustav Lejeune Dirichlet are traditionally credited with independently giving the modern "formal" definition of a function as a relation in which every first element has a unique second element.
Lobachevsky writes that
while Dirichlet writes
Eves asserts that "the student of mathematics usually meets the Dirichlet definition of function in his introductory course in calculus.
Dirichlet's claim to this formalization has been disputed by Imre Lakatos:
However, Gardiner says
"...it seems to me that Lakatos goes too far, for example, when he asserts that 'there is ample evidence that had no idea of concept'."
Moreover, as noted above, Dirichlet's paper does appear to include a definition along the lines of what is usually ascribed to him, even though he states it only for continuous functions of a real variable.
Similarly, Lavine observes that:
Because Lobachevsky and Dirichlet have been credited as among the first to introduce the notion of an arbitrary correspondence, this notion is sometimes referred to as the Dirichlet or Lobachevsky-Dirichlet definition of a function. A general version of this definition was later used by Bourbaki, and some in the education community refer to it as the "Dirichlet–Bourbaki" definition of a function.

Dedekind

, who was one of the founding members of the Bourbaki group, credits a precise and general modern definition of a function to Dedekind in his work
Was sind und was sollen die Zahlen, which appeared in 1888 but had already been drafted in 1878. Dieudonné observes that instead of confining himself, as in previous conceptions, to real functions, Dedekind defines a function as a single-valued mapping between any two sets:

Hardy

defined a function as a relation between two variables x and y such that "to some values of x at any rate correspond values of y." He neither required the function to be defined for all values of x nor to associate each value of x to a single value of y. This broad definition of a function encompasses more relations than are ordinarily considered functions in contemporary mathematics. For example, Hardy's definition includes multivalued functions and what in computability theory are called partial functions.

The logician's "function" prior to 1850

s of this time were primarily involved with analyzing syllogisms, or as Augustus De Morgan stated it: "the examination of that part of reasoning which depends upon the manner in which inferences are formed,
and the investigation of general maxims and rules for constructing arguments". At this time the notion of "function" is not explicit, but at least in the work of De Morgan and George Boole it is implied: we see abstraction of the argument forms, the introduction of variables, the introduction of a symbolic algebra with respect to these variables, and some of the notions of set theory.
De Morgan's 1847 "FORMAL LOGIC OR, The Calculus of Inference, Necessary and Probable" observes that " logical truth depends upon the structure of the statement, and not upon the particular matters spoken of"; he wastes no time abstracting: "In the form of the proposition, the copula is made as abstract as the terms". He immediately casts what he calls "the proposition" into a form such as "X is Y", where the symbols X, "is", and Y represent, respectively, the subject, copula, and predicate. While the word "function" does not appear, the notion of "abstraction" is there, "variables" are there, the notion of inclusion in his symbolism "all of the Δ is in the О" is there, and lastly a new symbolism for logical analysis of the notion of "relation" Y " is there:
In his 1848 The Nature of Logic Boole asserts that "logic ... is in a more especial sense the science of reasoning by signs", and he briefly discusses the notions of "belonging to" and "class": "An individual may possess a great variety of attributes and thus belonging to a great variety of different classes". Like De Morgan he uses the notion of "variable" drawn from analysis; he gives an example of "represent the class oxen by x and that of horses by y and the conjunction and by the sign +... we might represent the aggregate class oxen and horses by x + y".
In the context of "the Differential Calculus" Boole defined the notion of a function as follows:

The logicians' "function" 1850–1950

Eves observes "that logicians have endeavored to push down further the starting level of the definitional development of mathematics and to derive the theory of sets, or classes, from a foundation in the logic of propositions and propositional functions". But by the late 19th century the logicians' research into the foundations of mathematics was undergoing a major split. The direction of the first group, the Logicists, can probably be summed up best by – "to fulfil two objects, first, to show that all mathematics follows from symbolic logic, and secondly to discover, as far as possible, what are the principles of symbolic logic itself."
The second group of logicians, the set-theorists, emerged with Georg Cantor's "set theory" but were driven forward partly as a result of Russell's discovery of a paradox that could be derived from Frege's conception of "function", but also as a reaction against Russell's proposed solution. Zermelo's set-theoretic response was his 1908 Investigations in the foundations of set theory I – the first axiomatic set theory; here too the notion of "propositional function" plays a role.

George Boole's ''The Laws of Thought'' 1854; John Venn's ''Symbolic Logic'' 1881

In his An Investigation into the laws of thought Boole now defined a function in terms of a symbol x as follows:
Boole then used algebraic expressions to define both algebraic and logical notions, e.g., 1 − x is logical NOT, xy is the logical AND, x + y is the logical OR, x is xx + xy, and "the special law" xx = x2 = x.
In his 1881 Symbolic Logic Venn was using the words "logical function" and the contemporary symbolism, y = f −1 plus the circle-diagrams historically associated with Venn to describe "class relations", the notions "'quantifying' our predicate", "propositions in respect of their extension", "the relation of inclusion and exclusion of two classes to one another", and "propositional function", the bar over a variable to indicate not-x, etc. Indeed he equated unequivocally the notion of "logical function" with "class" : "... on the view adopted in this book, f never stands for anything but a logical class. It may be a compound class aggregated of many simple classes; it may be a class indicated by certain inverse logical operations, it may be composed of two groups of classes equal to one another, or what is the same thing, their difference declared equal to zero, that is, a logical equation. But however composed or derived, f with us will never be anything else than a general expression for such logical classes of things as may fairly find a place in ordinary Logic".

Frege's ''Begriffsschrift'' 1879

's Begriffsschrift preceded Giuseppe Peano, but Peano had no knowledge of until after he had published his 1889. Both writers strongly influenced. Russell in turn influenced much of 20th-century mathematics and logic through his Principia Mathematica jointly authored with Alfred North Whitehead.
At the outset Frege abandons the traditional "concepts subject and predicate", replacing them with argument and function respectively, which he believes "will stand the test of time. It is easy to see how regarding a content as a function of an argument leads to the formation of concepts. Furthermore, the demonstration of the connection between the meanings of the words if, and, not, or, there is, some, all, and so forth, deserves attention".
Frege begins his discussion of "function" with an example: Begin with the expression "Hydrogen is lighter than carbon dioxide". Now remove the sign for hydrogen and replace it with the sign for oxygen ; this makes a second statement. Do this again and substitute the sign for nitrogen and note that "This changes the meaning in such a way that "oxygen" or "nitrogen" enters into the relations in which "hydrogen" stood before". There are three statements:
Now observe in all three a "stable component, representing the totality of relations"; call this the function, i.e.,
Frege calls the argument of the function "he sign , regarded as replaceable by others that denotes the object standing in these relations". He notes that we could have derived the function as "Hydrogen is lighter than...." as well, with an argument position on the right; the exact observation is made by Peano. Finally, Frege allows for the case of two arguments. For example, remove "carbon dioxide" to yield the invariant part as:
The one-argument function Frege generalizes into the form Φ where A is the argument and Φ represents the function, whereas the two-argument function he symbolizes as Ψ with A and B the arguments and Ψ the function and cautions that "in general Ψ differs from Ψ". Using his unique symbolism he translates for the reader the following symbolism:

Peano's ''The Principles of Arithmetic'' 1889

Peano defined the notion of "function" in a manner somewhat similar to Frege, but without the precision. First Peano defines the sign "K means class, or aggregate of objects", the objects of which satisfy three simple equality-conditions, a = a, =, IF AND ) THEN. He then introduces φ, "a sign or an aggregate of signs such that if x is an object of the class s, the expression φx denotes a new object". Peano adds two conditions on these new objects: First, that the three equality-conditions hold for the objects φx; secondly, that "if x and y are objects of class s and if x = y, we assume it is possible to deduce φx = φy". Given all these conditions are met, φ is a "function presign". Likewise he identifies a "function postsign". For example if φ is the function presign a+, then φx yields a+x, or if φ is the function postsign +a then xφ yields x+a.

Bertrand Russell's ''The Principles of Mathematics'' 1903

While the influence of Cantor and Peano was paramount, in Appendix A "The Logical and Arithmetical Doctrines of Frege" of The Principles of Mathematics, Russell arrives at a discussion of Frege's notion of function, "...a point in which Frege's work is very important, and requires careful examination". In response to his 1902 exchange of letters with Frege about the contradiction he discovered in Frege's Begriffsschrift Russell tacked this section on at the last moment.
For Russell the bedeviling notion is that of "variable": "6. Mathematical propositions are not only characterized by the fact that they assert implications, but also by the fact that they contain variables. The notion of the variable is one of the most difficult with which logic has to deal. For the present, I openly wish to make it plain that there are variables in all mathematical propositions, even where at first sight they might seem to be absent.... We shall find always, in all mathematical propositions, that the words any or some occur; and these words are the marks of a variable and a formal implication".
As expressed by Russell "the process of transforming constants in a proposition into variables leads to what is called generalization, and gives us, as it were, the formal essence of a proposition... So long as any term in our proposition can be turned into a variable, our proposition can be generalized; and so long as this is possible, it is the business of mathematics to do it"; these generalizations Russell named propositional functions". Indeed he cites and quotes from Frege's Begriffsschrift and presents a vivid example from Frege's 1891 Function und Begriff: That "the essence of the arithmetical function 2x3 + x is what is left when the x is taken away, i.e., in the above instance 23 + . The argument x does not belong to the function but the two taken together make the whole". Russell agreed with Frege's notion of "function" in one sense: "He regards functions – and in this I agree with him – as more fundamental than predicates and relations" but Russell rejected Frege's "theory of subject and assertion", in particular "he thinks that, if a term a occurs in a proposition, the proposition can always be analysed into a and an assertion about a".

Evolution of Russell's notion of "function" 1908–1913

Russell would carry his ideas forward in his 1908 Mathematical logical as based on the theory of types and into his and Whitehead's 1910–1913 Principia Mathematica. By the time of Principia Mathematica Russell, like Frege, considered the propositional function fundamental: "Propositional functions are the fundamental kind from which the more usual kinds of function, such as "sin x" or log x or "the father of x" are derived. These derivative functions... are called "descriptive functions". The functions of propositions... are a particular case of propositional functions".
Propositional functions: Because his terminology is different from the contemporary, the reader may be confused by Russell's "propositional function". An example may help. Russell writes a propositional function in its raw form, e.g., as φŷ: "ŷ is hurt".. For our example, we will assign just 4 values to the variable ŷ: "Bob", "This bird", "Emily the rabbit", and "y". Substitution of one of these values for variable ŷ yields a proposition; this proposition is called a "value" of the propositional function. In our example there are four values of the propositional function, e.g., "Bob is hurt", "This bird is hurt", "Emily the rabbit is hurt" and "y is hurt." A proposition, if it is significant—i.e., if its truth is determinate—has a truth-value of truth or falsity. If a proposition's truth value is "truth" then the variable's value is said to satisfy the propositional function. Finally, per Russell's definition, "a class is all objects satisfying some propositional function". Note the word "all" – this is how the contemporary notions of "For all ∀" and "there exists at least one instance ∃" enter the treatment.
To continue the example: Suppose one determines that the propositions "Bob is hurt" has a truth value of "falsity", "This bird is hurt" has a truth value of "truth", "Emily the rabbit is hurt" has an indeterminate truth value because "Emily the rabbit" doesn't exist, and "y is hurt" is ambiguous as to its truth value because the argument y itself is ambiguous. While the two propositions "Bob is hurt" and "This bird is hurt" are significant, only the value "This bird" of the variable ŷ satisfies the propositional function φŷ: "ŷ is hurt". When one goes to form the class α: φŷ: "ŷ is hurt", only "This bird" is included, given the four values "Bob", "This bird", "Emily the rabbit" and "y" for variable ŷ and their respective truth-values: falsity, truth, indeterminate, ambiguous.
Russell defines functions of propositions with arguments, and truth-functions f'. For example, suppose one were to form the "function of propositions with arguments" p1: "NOT AND q" and assign its variables the values of p: "Bob is hurt" and q: "This bird is hurt".. Then the "function of propositions with arguments" is p1: NOT AND "This bird is hurt". To determine the truth value of this "function of propositions with arguments" we submit it to a "truth function", e.g., f: f, which yields a truth value of "truth".
The notion of a "many-one" functional relation": Russell first discusses the notion of "identity", then defines a descriptive function as the unique' value ιx that satisfies the propositional function φŷ.
Russell symbolizes the descriptive function as "the object standing in relation to y": R'y =DEF. Russell repeats that "R'y is a function of y, but not a propositional function ; we shall call it a descriptive function. All the ordinary functions of mathematics are of this kind. Thus in our notation "sin y" would be written " sin 'y ", and "sin" would stand for the relation sin 'y has to y".

The formalist's "function": David Hilbert's axiomatization of mathematics (1904–1927)

set himself the goal of "formalizing" classical mathematics "as a formal axiomatic theory, and this theory shall be proved to be consistent, i.e., free from contradiction". In The Foundations of Mathematics he frames the notion of function in terms of the existence of an "object":
Hilbert then illustrates the three ways how the ε-function is to be used, firstly as the "for all" and "there exists" notions, secondly to represent the "object of which holds", and lastly how to cast it into the choice function.
Recursion theory and computability: But the unexpected outcome of Hilbert's and his student Bernays's effort was failure; see Gödel's incompleteness theorems of 1931. At about the same time, in an effort to solve Hilbert's Entscheidungsproblem, mathematicians set about to define what was meant by an "effectively calculable function", i.e., "effective method" or "algorithm", that is, an explicit, step-by-step procedure that would succeed in computing a function. Various models for algorithms appeared, in rapid succession, including Church's lambda calculus, Stephen Kleene's μ-recursive functions and Alan Turing's notion of replacing human "computers" with utterly-mechanical "computing machines". It was shown that all of these models could compute the same class of computable functions. Church's thesis holds that this class of functions exhausts all the number-theoretic functions that can be calculated by an algorithm. The outcomes of these efforts were vivid demonstrations that, in Turing's words, "there can be no general process for determining whether a given formula U of the functional calculus K is provable"; see more at Independence and Computability theory.

Development of the set-theoretic definition of "function"

Set theory began with the work of the logicians with the notion of "class" for example, Jevons,, and. It was given a push by Georg Cantor's attempt to define the infinite in set-theoretic treatment and a subsequent discovery of an antinomy in this treatment, by Russell's discovery of an antinomy in Frege's 1879, by the discovery of more antinomies in the early 20th century, and by resistance to Russell's complex treatment of logic and dislike of his axiom of reducibility that he proposed as a means to evade the antinomies.

Russell's paradox 1902

In 1902 Russell sent a letter to Frege pointing out that Frege's 1879 Begriffsschrift allowed a function to be an argument of itself: "On the other hand, it may also be that the argument is determinate and the function indeterminate...." From this unconstrained situation Russell was able to form a paradox:
Frege responded promptly that "Your discovery of the contradiction caused me the greatest surprise and, I would almost say, consternation, since it has shaken the basis on which I intended to build arithmetic".
From this point forward development of the foundations of mathematics became an exercise in how to dodge "Russell's paradox", framed as it was in "the bare notions of set and element".

Zermelo's set theory (1908) modified by Skolem (1922)

The notion of "function" appears as Zermelo's axiom III—the Axiom of Separation. This axiom constrains us to use a propositional function Φ to "separate" a subset MΦ from a previously formed set M:
As there is no universal set — sets originate by way of Axiom II from elements of domain B – "...this disposes of the Russell antinomy so far as we are concerned". But Zermelo's "definite criterion" is imprecise, and is fixed by Weyl, Fraenkel, Skolem, and von Neumann.
In fact Skolem in his 1922 referred to this "definite criterion" or "property" as a "definite proposition":
van Heijenoort summarizes:
In this quote the reader may observe a shift in terminology: nowhere is mentioned the notion of "propositional function", but rather one sees the words "formula", "predicate calculus", "predicate", and "logical calculus." This shift in terminology is discussed more in the section that covers "function" in contemporary set theory.

The Wiener–Hausdorff–Kuratowski "ordered pair" definition 1914–1921

The history of the notion of "ordered pair" is not clear. As noted above, Frege proposed an intuitive ordering in his definition of a two-argument function Ψ. Norbert Wiener in his 1914 observes that his own treatment essentially "revert to Schröder's treatment of a relation as a class of ordered couples". considered the definition of a relation as a "class of couples" but rejected it:
By 1910–1913 and Principia Mathematica Russell had given up on the requirement for an intensional definition of a relation, stating that "mathematics is always concerned with extensions rather than intensions" and "Relations, like classes, are to be taken in extension". To demonstrate the notion of a relation in extension Russell now embraced the notion of ordered couple: "We may regard a relation... as a class of couples... the relation determined by φ is the class of couples for which φ is true". In a footnote he clarified his notion and arrived at this definition:
But he goes on to say that he would not introduce the ordered couples further into his "symbolic treatment"; he proposes his "matrix" and his unpopular axiom of reducibility in their place.
An attempt to solve the problem of the antinomies led Russell to propose his "doctrine of types" in an appendix B of his 1903 The Principles of Mathematics. In a few years he would refine this notion and propose in his 1908 The Theory of Types two axioms of reducibility, the purpose of which were to reduce propositional functions and relations to a "lower" form ; he and Alfred North Whitehead would carry this treatment over to Principia Mathematica 1910–1913 with a further refinement called "a matrix". The first axiom is *12.1; the second is *12.11. To quote Wiener the second axiom *12.11 "is involved only in the theory of relations". Both axioms, however, were met with skepticism and resistance; see more at Axiom of reducibility. By 1914 Norbert Wiener, using Whitehead and Russell's symbolism, eliminated axiom *12.11 by expressing a relation as an ordered pair using the null set. At approximately the same time, Hausdorff gave the definition of the ordered pair as. A few years later Kuratowski offered a definition that has been widely used ever since, namely ". As noted by "This definition... was historically important in reducing the theory of relations to the theory of sets.
Observe that while Wiener "reduced" the relational *12.11 form of the axiom of reducibility he did not reduce nor otherwise change the propositional-function form *12.1; indeed he declared this "essential to the treatment of identity, descriptions, classes and relations".

Schönfinkel's notion of "function" as a many-one "correspondence" 1924

Where exactly the general notion of "function" as a many-one correspondence derives from is unclear. Russell in his 1920 Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy states that "It should be observed that all mathematical functions result form one-many relations... Functions in this sense are descriptive functions". A reasonable possibility is the Principia Mathematica notion of "descriptive function" – R 'y =DEF : "the singular object that has a relation R to y". Whatever the case, by 1924, Moses Schönfinkel expressed the notion, claiming it to be "well known":
According to Willard Quine, "provide for... the whole sweep of abstract set theory. The crux of the matter is that Schönfinkel lets functions stand as arguments. For Schönfinkel, substantially as for Frege, classes are special sorts of functions. They are propositional functions, functions whose values are truth values. All functions, propositional and otherwise, are for Schönfinkel one-place functions". Remarkably, Schönfinkel reduces all mathematics to an extremely compact functional calculus consisting of only three functions: Constancy, fusion, and mutual exclusivity. Quine notes that Haskell Curry carried this work forward "under the head of combinatory logic".

Von Neumann's set theory 1925

By 1925 Abraham Fraenkel and Thoralf Skolem had amended Zermelo's set theory of 1908. But von Neumann was not convinced that this axiomatization could not lead to the antinomies. So he proposed his own theory, his 1925 An axiomatization of set theory. It explicitly contains a "contemporary", set-theoretic version of the notion of "function":
At the outset he begins with I-objects and II-objects, two objects A and B that are I-objects, and two types of "operations" that assume ordering as a structural property obtained of the resulting objects and. The two "domains of objects" are called "arguments" and "functions" ; where they overlap are the "argument functions". He introduces two "universal two-variable operations" – the operation : "... read 'the value of the function x for the argument y... it itself is a type I object", and the operation : "... whose variables x and y must both be arguments and that itself produces an argument. Its most important property is that x1 = x2 and y1 = y2 follow from = ". To clarify the function pair he notes that "Instead of f we write to indicate that f, just like x, is to be regarded as a variable in this procedure". To avoid the "antinomies of naive set theory, in Russell's first of all... we must forgo treating certain functions as arguments". He adopts a notion from Zermelo to restrict these "certain functions".
Suppes observes that von Neumann's axiomatization was modified by Bernays "in order to remain nearer to the original Zermelo system... He introduced two membership relations: one between sets, and one between sets and classes". Then Gödel further modified the theory: "his primitive notions are those of set, class and membership ". This axiomatization is now known as von Neumann–Bernays–Gödel set theory.

Bourbaki 1939

In 1939, Bourbaki, in addition to giving the well-known ordered pair definition of a function as a certain subset of the cartesian product E × F, gave the following:
"Let E and F be two sets, which may or may not be distinct. A relation between a variable element x of E and a variable element y of F is called a functional relation in y if, for all x ∈ E, there exists a unique y ∈ F which is in the given relation with x.
We give the name of function to the operation which in this way associates with every element x ∈ E the element y ∈ F which is in the given relation with x, and the function is said to be determined by the given functional relation. Two equivalent functional relations determine the same function."

Since 1950

Notion of "function" in contemporary set theory

Both axiomatic and naive forms of Zermelo's set theory as modified by Fraenkel and Skolem define "function" as a relation, define a relation as a set of ordered pairs, and define an ordered pair as a set of two "dissymetric" sets.
While the reader of Axiomatic Set Theory or Naive Set Theory observes the use of function-symbolism in the axiom of separation, e.g., φ and S, they will see no mention of "proposition" or even "first order predicate calculus". In their place are "expressions of the object language", "atomic formulae", "primitive formulae", and "atomic sentences".
defines the words as follows: "In word languages, a proposition is expressed by a sentence. Then a 'predicate' is expressed by an incomplete sentence or sentence skeleton containing an open place. For example, "___ is a man" expresses a predicate... The predicate is a propositional function of one variable. Predicates are often called 'properties'... The predicate calculus will treat of the logic of predicates in this general sense of 'predicate', i.e., as propositional function".
In 1954, Bourbaki, on p. 76 in Chapitre II of Theorie des Ensembles, gave a definition of a function as a triple f =. Here F is a functional graph, meaning a set of pairs where no two pairs have the same first member. On p. 77 Bourbaki states : "Often we shall use, in the remainder of this Treatise, the word function instead of functional graph."
in Axiomatic Set Theory, formally defines a relation as a set of pairs, and a function as a relation where no two pairs have the same first member.

Relational form of a function

The reason for the disappearance of the words "propositional function" e.g., in, and, is explained by together with further explanation of the terminology:
For his part Tarski calls the relational form of function a "FUNCTIONAL RELATION or simply a FUNCTION". After a discussion of this "functional relation" he asserts that:
See more about "truth under an interpretation" at Alfred Tarski.