Kaprun disaster


The Kaprun disaster was a fire that occurred in an ascending train in the tunnel of the Gletscherbahn Kaprun2 funicular in Kaprun, Austria on 11 November 2000. The disaster killed 155 people. There were 12 survivors from the burning ascending train. Most of the victims were skiers on their way to the Kitzsteinhorn Glacier.

The train

The Gletscherbahn Kaprun 2 was a funicular railway running from Kaprun to the Kitzsteinhorn, opened in 1974. In 1993, it was modernized, giving the trains a sleek, futuristic look, also making them the pride of Austria's ski resorts. This railway had the unusual track gauge of and a length of, with of track inside a tunnel. The train climbed and descended the tunnel at, inclined at 30 degrees. There were two carriages on a single track, with a section allowing them to pass each other halfway. One carried passengers up the mountain while its twin simultaneously descended. The tunnel terminated at the main reception centre, called the Alpincenter, where a powerful motorized winch system pulled the wagons. There were neither engines, fuel tanks, nor drivers, only low-voltage electrical systems, hydraulic tanks and an attendant who operated the hydraulic doors.
Each train had four passenger compartments and a cab at front and rear for the attendant, who switched back and forth as they travelled up and down. It could carry up to 180 passengers.

The disaster

On 11 November 2000, 161 passengers and one conductor boarded the funicular train for an early morning trip to the slopes. Prior to the passenger train leaving the lower terminus shortly after 9:00a.m., the electric fan heater in the unattended cabin at the lower end of the train caught fire, officially due to a design flaw that caused the unit to overheat. The resulting fire severed plastic pipes carrying flammable hydraulic fluid from the brake system, fueling the fire rapidly whilst resulting in the loss of fluid pressure which caused the train to halt unexpectedly into the tunnel. Several minutes later, the train conductor, who was in the control cabin at the upper end of the train, realized that a fire had broken out, reported it to the control centre, and attempted to open the hydraulically-operated doors, but the system pressure loss prevented them from operating. The train conductor then lost contact with the control centre, because the fire had burned through a 16kV power cable running alongside the length of the track, causing a total blackout throughout the entire ski resort.
The passengers, by this stage aware of the fire and unable to exit through the doors, attempted to break the shatter-resistant acrylic windows in order to escape. Twelve people from the rear of the train, who successfully broke a window with a ski pole, followed the advice of another escapee who had been a volunteer firefighter for 20 years, and escaped downwards past the fire and below the smoke, to safety.
Many of the still-trapped occupants had by now lost consciousness due to toxic fumes. Eventually, the conductor managed to unlock the doors manually, with those passengers still conscious spilling out into the tunnel and fleeing upwards and away from the fire. The tunnel acted like a giant chimney, sucking oxygen in from the bottom and rapidly sent the poisonous smoke, heat and the fire itself billowing upwards. All the passengers ascending on foot, as well as the train conductor, were asphyxiated by the smoke and then burned by the raging fire.
The toxic smoke quickly reached the halted second train killing the conductor and sole passenger heading downward, before arriving at the Alpine Centre located at the top end of the track away. Two employees of the Alpine Centre who first noticed the smoke, alerted employees and customers before escaping through an emergency exit leaving the doors open and increasing the tunnel´s chimney effect through increased air flow, further intensifying the fire. The centre filled with smoke quickly and all but four people escaped from the centre. Firefighters arriving at the centre managed to save one of the four, while the other three died of asphyxiation.

Investigation and trials

In the subsequent criminal trial in Salzburg, 16 accused were charged, including the management of Gletscherbahnen Kaprun AG.
The indictment was based on § 170 StGB, negligent causing a conflagration and § 177 StGB, negligent public risk. Below the 16 accused persons are listed and the related reasons for their acquittals including quotations from the judgment itself as well as some votes against the judgement which came from German prosecution some years after the trial in Austria:
Three employees of Gletscherbahnen Kaprun AG; specifically the technical director, the main manager and the manager; According to the indictment, when the wagon bodies were rebuilt in 1993/94 they had failed to ensure their safe construction and equipment in accordance with the state of the art. The acquittal was based, among other things, on the legal standards of the time, which related to the fire protection safety standards for funicular railways. In relation to these Austrian legal norms, the judgment stated: "A review of the same showed that the relevant norms did not exist here and therefore claims could not be derived from this legal material". In relation to an EU cable car directive, which names the funicular as a vehicle, contrary to Austrian law, where a funicular was not a vehicle in the classic sense, it is stated that the violation of this EU directive, which was also valid in Austria at the time, " does not constitute a basis for criminal liability ”. The reason for this is a decision of the European Court of Justice itself. Furthermore, it was noted: "The fire trigger was a design, production and material defect in the fan heater housing and no dirt residues or oil leaks".
Years later, the German public prosecutor's office in Heilbronn contradicted this judgement in their own investigation report, in which it was stated that the space heater had no design errors. Instead, it had been modified to be illegally installed into the funicular against its intended use as home appliance only. Six years after the fire in Kaprun, the German authority was able to prove both, the presence of dirt and hydraulic oil in the identical fan heater from the undamaged second train. This finding of evidence was based not only on material examinations but also on original photos from the Austrian authority itself. In the earlier Salzburg trial the fan heater had not been examined inside on the explicit instructions of the judge at the time.
Two managing directors of the Austrian Swoboda Karosserie- und Stahlbau GesmbH, whose employees disassembled simple household fan heaters of the Fakir Hobby TLB brand instead of suitable Domo fan heaters and installed them in an improper in-house design in the valley-side driver's cabs. According to the acquittal, the managing directors themselves were not at fault, because they had given their purchasing department clear instructions to purchase a device that was "officially approved". In this case specifically a Domo fan heater; the same one that the Swoboda company had already legally built into the Salzburg fortress funicular railway back then. When ordering, one of the managing directors enclosed the associated instructions for use, so that the purchasing department would really order the right device again. After the staff of the Swoboda purchasing department discovered that Domo fan heaters were not available at the time, they ordered simple devices for private households as an alternative, namely Fakir Hobby TLB fan heaters. According to the acquittal, the Swoboda management itself had no knowledge that other unsuitable devices had now been purchased by the purchasing staff. According to the judgment, a foreman of the Swoboda company, who picked up the devices ordered from the Höller-Eisen company in Gmunden, did not notice that the purchasing department had actually purchased unsuitable devices and handed them over for installation trusting that the order was correct. This is also why the electrical workshop of the Swoboda company later handed over manuals for the actual Domo fan heater to the Gletscherbahnen Kaprun AG. These manuals for the correct Domo devices were included in advance with the documents for the glacier railways and also for the Siemens company, which later also participated in the construction of the train. The responsible personnel at Swoboda assumed from the outset that the correct equipment would be installed in the train at the time of delivery. Even Gletscherbahnen Kaprun AG had correctly requested "4 fan heaters like Salzburg fortress railway" from Swoboda in their order, that is, approved and above all suitable devices. In the written judgment regarding the now wrongly installed fan heater, it was stated that "the radiator was provided with all the appropriate security stickers". "The evidence procedure also revealed that the wrong operating instructions were given to Gletscherbahnen Kaprun AG, namely the manual of a Domo fan heater." And " that Siemens AG also had a data sheet about the Domo fan heater” However, the fact that the user manual of the Fakir devices generally expressly referred to the fact that the device should not be opened for safety reasons and that security stickers etc. would become invalid was not mentioned in the judgment. For the original order of the Domo fan heater by the management of Swoboda, the following is again noted in the judgement: " as it was used in an officially approved manner in the Salzburg funicular railway at that time".
The German VDE, i.e. the publisher of the security stickers on the fan heater, determined a few years after the judgment that the stickers lost their validity due to the conversion of the devices and that the use of this fan heater in this way of installation generally no longer was allowed, regardless of the place of use.
Three employees of the German Mannesmann-Rexroth AG ; these installed flammable oil-carrying hydraulic lines in both trains directly behind and above the positions of the valley side heaters. Although published images from Austrian authority show hydraulic oil in the radiant heater of the "glacier dragon" train that has been preserved, the opposite was stated in the judgment. In the photos there would only be red-colored condensation, caused by a reflection. The discovery of the hydraulic oil was officially withdrawn in court by two people who were explicitly interviewed, but was confirmed by one of the two witnesses after the trial, as well as by the dismissed chief assessor Anton Muhr, who still rejects the view of the court. Contrary to practice, the oil was not sampled in the first process. The verdict finally stated: "As already generally stated, the fire of November 11, 2000 was not a leak in the hydraulic system, no hydraulic oil leaked ". The three defendants of Mannesmann-Rexroth AG were acquitted on the following grounds: “It is expressly stated that when the cables were laid by the three accused hydraulic technicians, the fan heater was no longer installed. It cannot be determined when it was reinstalled after the work was completed. It can no longer be determined who removed these fan heaters before the piping work began."
This means that in the judgment it is assumed that the technicians did not know that a fan heater would be installed near the pipes they laid and that the opposite, i.e. that the fitters were aware of it, could not be proven.
Three officials from the Ministry of Transport, who had issued the railway operating license. These were again acquitted on the grounds that the Fakir fan heaters would have been suitable, since they would have valid security stickers, and that the danger of fire on funicular railways would not have been known: "Regarding the officials of the Federal Ministry of Transport, Innovation and Technology With regard to the materials used, as well as the technology and safety devices and the fan heater, reference should be made to the statements already made Even in the railroad building permit procedure, the authority had no indications, incidents or concerns that funicular railways could be dangerous in terms of fire protection “.
Two inspectors from the TÜV, who approved the train and did not complain about existing defects. These shortcomings mainly related to statements by the expert Anton Muhr. The latter criticized a timber shoring that was not registered with the TÜV, which was installed by employees of the Gletscherbahnen Kaprun AG in the desk near the fan heaters and was stuffed with rock wool. According to the expert Muhr, this rock wool was sucked in by the fan heaters. Here it is said in the acquittal: " that it was not possible to determine when the wood shoring was sealed with the stone wool in the evidence procedure, so it could not be said that at the time of the inspection by the TÜV employees the wool would already have existed. The court assumes that concerning the time of installation the installation was made before the inspection done by the TÜV. a conspicuity of the timber shoring was not given "and further it says" that the timber shoring has no actual connection with the development or spread of fire. "In relation to the hydraulic lines on the rear wall of the fan heater it was said: "With regard to the laying of the hydraulic lines on the rear wall of the fan heater, it is assumed that the hydraulic system is a complex assembly, so that this system was not up for a review at this time. "
Two technicians and a builder who were involved in the installation of a fire door at the exit station of the mountain station. After successful closure at the moment of the power failure at the mountain station, an attempt was made to manually open the door by the operations manager who did not close it afterwards, allowing smoke to enter from the tunnel, which cost the lives of several people in the mountain station. In concrete terms, however, the three suspects were a technician who had installed the door, a test technician who had carried out the official inspection of the door, and a builder who had inspected the system again in September 2000. However, the persons mentioned had not let themselves get into debt, since the door worked as prescribed and in the event of a fire it should not have been opened by hand or left open afterwards. Quotation: " whereby the question of single or multiple closing was seen by the court in such a way that closing the door once is sufficient, which derives from the wording of the Ö-Norm “.
Nearly one year after the fire, the official inquiry determined the cause was the failure, overheating and ignition of one of the fan heaters installed in the conductor's compartments that were not designed for use in a moving vehicle, much less a train. The ignition was caused when a design fault caused the unit to overheat, which in turn caused the plastic mount for the heating element to break off, causing the element to jam against its plastic casing and catch fire. A slow leak of highly flammable hydraulic oil was ignited by the burning, melting heater, which in turn melted the plastic fluid lines, further feeding the flames and also resulting in the hydraulic pressure loss which caused the train to stop and the doors to fail.
The structural flaws of the funicular trains, especially the lack of safety mechanisms, were found to have played a role in the tragedy. Each funicular unit had its fire extinguishers out of the passengers' reach in the sealed attendants' compartments. No smoke detectors were installed. There was no cellphone reception within the tunnels, which meant passengers had no method of contacting the attendant. Professor Joseph Nejez, a funicular train expert, said the designers throughout the years had a perception that a fire could not occur since no fire had occurred in a funicular cabin prior to the Kaprun disaster. The train complied with area safety codes, which did not address the systems installed on the train during its 1993 upgrade. The onboard electric power, hydraulic braking systems, and fan heaters intended for use in homes instead of trains increased the likelihood of fire.

Casualties and aftermath

The funicular was never reopened after the disaster and was replaced by a gondola lift, a 24-person Gletscherjet1 funitel. The stations were abandoned and the tunnel sealed, and it remains unused today. The site though, has been frequented by some skiers who wanted to explore its dark interiors and film the remains of the burned tunnel.
The track and tunnel remained in place for over a decade after the disaster, although never used by paying passengers. As of 2014, the track and supporting structure below the tunnel has been completely removed, with just a gap in the trees to indicate where it stood. Skiers and sightseers now reach the Alpincentre using either the Gletscherjet1 or Panaromabahn cable cars to an intermediate station, followed by the Gletscherjet2 cable car or Langwiedbahn chairlift to the Alpincentre, though they can also still use the original Gletscherbahn1.
On 19 February 2004, Judge Manfred Seiss acquitted all 16 suspects, including company officials, technicians, and government inspectors, clearing them of criminal negligence. Seiss said there was insufficient evidence to find the suspects responsible for the conditions that led to the blaze. In September 2007, the public prosecutor's office determined the manufacturer of the electric heater was not responsible.
One of the victims was Sandra Schmitt, a 19-year-old German freestyle skier who at the time was the reigning Women's Dual Moguls World Champion. Josef Schaupper, a seven-time Deaflympic medalist, was also killed in the fatal accident along with his fellow deaf skiers. Another was United States Army Major Michael Goodridge with his wife Jennifer and sons Michael, 7 and Kyle, 5.

Memorial

On 11 November 2004, a memorial to the victims was officially inaugurated. The elongated blocks of exposed concrete and glass steles are located opposite the valley station of the Gletscherbahnen.
The difference in color of the glass strips should symbolize every individual human being. The individual glass slits are each dedicated to a specific person. Each slit of light stands as a symbol for a life.