Moore v. Texas, 581 U.S. ___, was a United States Supreme Court decision clarifying that, in order to comply with Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, courts must use legitimate medical diagnostic criteria when diagnosing mental disabilities in those on death row. The Court relied on Atkins, which held that the execution of any individual with a mental disability is unconstitutional, in holding that "mild levels of intellectual disability... nevertheless remain intellectual disabilities... and States may not execute anyone in the entire category of intellectually disabled offenders."
Background
Case background
On April 25, 1980, Bobby James Moore and two others committed an armed robbery of Birdsall Super Market in Houston, Texas. Upon arrival at the supermarket, Moore and the two others went to a courtesy booth staffed by two employees, James McCarble and Edna Scott. Once Scott realized that an armed robbery was taking place, she started to scream; Moore then shot McCarble in the head, killing the 70 year-old employee. Moore fled the scene and was arrested 10 days later, upon which arrest Moore was charged with capital murder. A jury sentenced Moore to death. For over the next three decades, Moore was situated within the legal system, appealing his decisions. In 2014, the state habeas court committed to a two-day hearing, in which many witnesses—including Moore's family, mental health professionals and a prison official—spoke. This court then concluded that Moore had shown an intellectual disability, and suggested to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals that he be granted relief. The TexasCourt of Criminal Appeals, as the final arbiter of habeas in Texas, declined to follow the habeas court's suggestions and began its own hearing. In compliance with Atkins, the Court of Criminal Appeals used Texas precedent in determining whether Moore was mentally disabled or not; this precedent was Ex parte Briseno. Briseno uses a test of diagnosing mental disabilities, using the following criteria :
Did those who knew the person best during the developmental stage—his family, friends, teachers, employers, authorities—think he was mentally retarded at that time, and, if so, act in accordance with that determination?
Has the person formulated plans and carried them through or is his conduct impulsive?
Does his conduct show leadership or does it show that he is led around by others?
Is his conduct in response to external stimuli rational and appropriate, regardless of whether it is socially acceptable?
Does he respond coherently, rationally, and on point to oral or written questions or do his responses wander from subject to subject?
Can the person hide facts or lie effectively in his own or others’ interests?
Putting aside any heinousness or gruesomeness surrounding the capital offense, did the commission of that offense require forethought, planning, and complex execution of purpose?
Using the Briseno factors, the CCA conducted an I.Q. test in 1989, which he scored a 74 I.Q. on. At the time, as Justice Ginsburg notes, the standard error for the I.Q. test was 5 points in both directions, meaning that Moore had an I.Q. range of 69 to 79. In Atkins, the Court noted that an I.Q. score of 70 or lower was generally indicative of an intellectual disability. While noting the low scoring I.Q., the CCA argued that because Moore had displayed general ability to persevere despite his disability - he had been able to be employed in field work, for example - he was able to be executed while not violating Atkins.
Legal background
In Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled on a 6-3 decision that executing the mentally disabled violated the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment, but that states may define intellectual and mental disability on their own. Twelve years later, in Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. ___, the Court narrowed the discretion under which states may designate those on death penalty as intellectually disabled. In Hall, the Court argued that "where an IQ score is close to, but above, 70, courts must account for the test’s standard error of measurement." To this end, because Moore had an I.Q. range of 69–79, he would be included as having a "mild mental disability".
Decision
In a 5-3 decision, Associate Justice Ginsburg wrote the majority opinion, to which Associate JusticesKennedy, Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan joined. Chief Justice Roberts filed a dissent, to which Associate Justices Thomas and Alito joined. The Court held that because Moore had a mild mental disability, executing him would violate the Eighth Amendment, following precedent set by both Hall and Atkins. The Court further held that the Briseno test employed by Texas courts was insufficient and was not applied meaningfully. Because the State often misused Briseno in areas of diagnosing mental disability in education or employment, and because Briseno was based around "lay" rather than medical diagnosis and understanding of mental disability, that it could not hold up. To this end, the Court held that using the DSM-V was preferable to using an outdated 1992 precedent. In his dissent, Chief JusticeRoberts argued that "he Court... crafts a constitutional holding based solely on what it deems to be medical consensus about intellectual disability. But clinicians, not judges, should determine clinical standards; and judges, not clinicians, should determine the content of the Eighth Amendment. Today’s opinion confuses those roles, and I respectfully dissent." He argued that there is no jurisprudence or no legal reasoning that the court should be the final arbiter for what constitutes "intellectual disability", and that clinicians are those who are qualified to make that judgement, rather than judges.
