Operation Herkules


Operation Herkules was the German code-name given to an abortive plan for the invasion of Malta during the Second World War. Through air and sea landings, the Italians and Germans hoped to eliminate Malta as a British air and naval base and secure an uninterrupted flow of supplies across the Mediterranean Sea to Axis forces in Libya and Egypt.
Extensive preparations were made for the invasion but the success of other Axis operations – including the Battle of Gazala, the Axis capture of Tobruk on 21 June and Operation Aïda, the pursuit of the Allies into Egypt – led to Herkules being postponed and then cancelled in November 1942.

Origins

The Axis plan to invade Malta had its origin in Italian military studies conducted during Second Italo-Abyssinian War in the mid-1930s. By 1938, Comando Supremo, the Italian army general staff, had estimated the amount of sea transport it would require to move military forces into North Africa, and identified the seizure of Malta as a prerequisite. An outline plan for a seaborne assault was drawn up and periodically revised but the Regia Marina initially showed little interest in it.Greene/Massignani, p. 64 The concept of an invasion was approved at a meeting between Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini from 29 to 30 April 1942.

Axis plans and preparations

Airborne forces

Command of the airborne component of Herkules was given to Generalmajor Kurt Student and Fliegerkorps XI. Student had commanded the German airborne assault in the Battle of Crete in May 1941. This time, Student had months to prepare and learn from the mistakes made on Crete. Knowledge of British defensive positions on Malta was extensive, thanks to meticulous aerial mapping by the Italians. Every fortification, artillery emplacement and AA battery was carefully noted and scrutinised. Student claimed later that "We even knew the calibre of the coastal guns, and how many degrees they could be turned inland". Ten Gruppen of Junkers Ju 52 transports, with 500 aircraft, were allocated for the air landings, along with 300 DFS 230 gliders and 200 larger Go 242 gliders. Also to be included were two dozen Messerschmitt Me 321 Gigant gliders capable of carrying up to 200 fully equipped paratroopers or a tank. These were to be towed by new He 111Z five-engined versions of the He 111 medium bomber.
The Regia Aeronautica would contribute 180 to 220 transport aircraft, mostly three-engined SM.75s, SM.81s and SM.82s. Given the distance between Axis airfields on Sicily and the drop zones over Malta, it was possible for the motorised transports to make four round-trips per day. The aircraft were to drop one Italian and one German airborne division onto the southern side of the island. The paratroopers had to secure the high ground behind the invasion beaches and seize a nearby airfield for Axis transport aircraft to land another division and supplies.Greene/Massignani, p. 67 Airborne units for the invasion included the German Fliegerdivision 7 plus the Italian 185th Airborne Division Folgore and the 80th Infantry Division La Spezia airlanding division approximately 29,000 airborne troops. Preparations for the airborne assault included construction of three glider strips south of Mount Etna on Sicily.

Amphibious forces

The seaborne assault force comprised 70,000 Italian troops who were to make amphibious landings at two points on the south-eastern side of the island, in Marsaxlokk bay, the main effort falling upon a site named "Famagosta beach" and a smaller secondary landing at "Larnaca beach". Also to be seized were the lesser islands of Gozo and Comino. Amphibious feints would be directed at St. Paul's Bay, Mellieha Bay and north-west of Valletta near the old Victoria Lines, to draw British attention away from the real landing sites.Greene/Massignani, p. 70 The main assault convoy was scheduled to begin landing on Malta just before midnight on the first day, after the airborne forces had landed in the afternoon and secured the heights above the beaches. The bulk of the first-wave assault troops would come from the Friuli Infantry Division and the Livorno Infantry Division of the Italian XXX Corps. Also included were 1,200 men from the 1st Assault Battalion and Loreto Battalion two battalions of San Marco Marines three battalions of Blackshirts and 300 Nuotatori. Armoured support comprised nineteen Semovente 47/32 and eight Semovente 75/18 self-propelled guns plus thirty L3 tankettes.Greene/Massignani, p. 66
The follow-up convoy would be mainly made up of troops from the Italian XVI Corps: the Assieta Infantry Division, the Napoli Infantry Division, artillery units and the remainder of the 10th Armoured Regiment. The Superga Infantry Division plus a battalion of Blackshirts and 1,000 San Marco Marines were to be in position to land on the smaller island of Gozo in the early hours of the second day. Additional armour intended for Herkules included 2.Kompanie/Panzerabteilung z.b.V.66, a German unit partly equipped with captured Russian tanks. Ten assorted KV-1 and KV-2 heavy tanks were made available. At least ten Italian motozattere were modified with reinforced flooring and internal ramps to carry the Russian vehicles. Other tanks in the unit included captured Russian T-34 medium tanks, up-armoured German light tanks plus twelve German Panzer IVGs armed with guns. Twenty German Panzer III tanks were also offered for use in the invasion but it is not known what unit these were to be drawn from. Two days were allowed for the amphibious assault and landing of the follow-up convoy, though this was dependent on quickly securing Marsaxlokk Bay to land heavier artillery pieces and a much higher tonnage of supplies.Greene/Massignani, p. 71

Landings

Lacking enough landing craft for an amphibious assault, the Regia Marina secured plans from the German Kriegsmarine to build copies of the Marinefährprahm Type A in Italian shipyards. These shallow-draught vessels, were capable of transporting up to 200 equipped infantry, 2–3 medium tanks, or an equivalent weight in cargo and could unload onto an open beach via a drop-down bow ramp. Sixty-five of these motozattere were completed by July 1942 and about fifty were available for the invasion. Twenty German MFPs were transferred to the Mediterranean via the river Rhone to make up for an expected shortfall of Italian-built landing craft.
German-operated landing craft were sent to Italy via rail for the invasion, including twelve Siebel ferries, six Type 39 Pionierlandungsboote, six Type 40 Pionierlandungsboote, a company of eighty-one Sturmboote plus an assortment of large inflatable rafts. Some rafts were powered by outboard motors and others had to be rowed.
The Italians assembled a collection of other naval craft to transport the amphibious forces. These included two former Strait of Messina railway ferries ; ten passenger ships, six former passenger ferries, six cargo ships, 30 ex-trawlers ; five converted minelayers and 74 assorted motorboats. The Italians also requested the use of 200 additional German Sturmboote to quickly transfer men from ship to shore. The Italian landing flotilla and the supporting ships formed the "Special Naval Force" under Admiral Vittorio Tur.
Specialised landing equipment slated for Herkules included the Seeschlange, a floating ship-to-shore bridge originally developed by the German Army for Operation Sea Lion. It was formed from a series of joined modules that could be towed into place and act as a temporary jetty. Moored ships could then unload their cargo either directly onto the "roadway" or lower it down onto the Seeschlange via their cranes. The Seeschlange had been tested by the Army Training Unit at Le Havre in the fall of 1941 and was easily transportable by rail.

Naval escort

The Regia Marina had to protect the invasion convoys from attacks by the British Mediterranean Fleet and provide gunfire support during the landings. The force assigned to accomplish this included four battleships, four heavy cruisers, eight light cruisers and 21 destroyers. These ships would assemble and sortie from the ports of Messina, Reggio Calabria, Augusta and Cagliari. The two older Andrea Doria-class battleships would carry approximately 200 rounds each for shore bombardment.
Italian and German submarines were to scout for and intercept British naval forces attempting to interfere with the seaborne landings. One submarine was to be stationed midway between Sicily and Malta, to act as a guide beacon for the transport aircraft on their way to and from the drop zones.
The Italians were confident they could defeat any daylight incursions by the Mediterranean Fleet, especially given the Luftwaffe's ability to dominate the daytime skies, but there were concerns the Italian fleet would face serious difficulties if the British attacked at night. Lacking ship-borne radar and having neglected night-fighting training and equipment, the Regia Marina had been defeated at the Battle of Cape Matapan in March 1941. A similar encounter off Malta might wreak havoc on the slow-moving Axis invasion convoys, leaving the airborne forces cut off and imperilling Axis chances of taking the island.Greene/Massignani, p. 209–213
The Regia Marina had made some efforts to rectify this situation by equipping the battleship Littorio with an experimental E.C.-3/bis Gufo radar apparatus in August 1941, but the unit was considered unreliable. In September 1941, while awaiting production of Italian-made radar units in quantity, the Regia Marina requested from the Kriegsmarine a FuMO 24/40 G DeTe unit for the new destroyer, Legionario. DeTe units could detect surface ships up to away. By March 1942, the set had been delivered and installed and a small group of Italian ratings had been trained in Germany on its use. Operational testing began that spring and by May, the fleet commander Vice-Admiral Angelo Iachino had submitted a report praising its performance.

Malta defences

In 1942 the garrison of Malta consisted of 15 infantry battalions organised into four brigades totalling 26,000 men. Tank support was provided by the 1st Independent Troop of the Royal Tank Regiment, disembarked in November 1940, which was initially equipped with four Matilda II Infantry Tanks, armed with 2-pounder guns, and two Vickers Mk.VIC light tanks, armed with two machine guns. These were reinforced in January 1942 by four Cruiser Mk I and three Cruiser Mk IV tanks and a Vickers Mk.VIC light tank, with the cruisers armed with 2-pounder guns. Artillery support came from the 12th Field Regiment, Royal Artillery with twenty-four 25-pounder field guns, capable of providing fire support out to a range of and covering most of the island while remaining in protected static positions.Greene/Massignani, p. 68 Malta's fixed defences included nineteen heavy coastal guns, 130 smaller coastal guns and 112 heavy and 144 light anti-aircraft guns.
The smaller coastal guns comprised:
A date near mid-July 1942 was set for the invasion, partly to allow time to bring troops from other front line positions. Field Marshal Erwin Rommel supported the Malta plan and asked Hitler for command of the invasion forces. His reasons for supporting an invasion were to hinder the Allied troops fighting in Africa, as well as to remove the threat to the convoys heading to Italian-German forces with supplies, oil and men, all of which they lacked. He prioritised the attack to such an extent that he was willing to move units from his front for the attack. The head of the Luftwaffe, Hermann Göring, opposed the invasion, fearing it would turn into another near-disaster for his paratroops, as had happened in the Invasion of Crete. Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring tirelessly promoted Unternehmen Herkules but even he was eventually dissuaded when it became apparent that too many air and ground units had been siphoned off to support the Axis drive into Egypt, diminishing any chance of success. With Hitler lacking faith in the parachute divisions after Crete and in the ability of the Italian Navy to protect the invasion fleet from British naval attacks, the plan was cancelled.