Ottoman reconquest of the Morea


The Ottoman reconquest of the Morea took place in June–September 1715, during the Seventh Ottoman–Venetian War. The Ottoman army, under Grand Vizier Silahdar Damat Ali Pasha, aided by the fleet under Kapudan Pasha Canım Hoca Mehmed Pasha conquered the Morea peninsula in southern Greece, which had been captured by the Republic of Venice in the 1680s, during the Sixth Ottoman–Venetian War. The Ottoman reconquest inaugurated the second period of Ottoman rule in the Morea, which ended with the outbreak of the Greek War of Independence in 1821.

Background

Following the Ottoman Empire's defeat in the Second Siege of Vienna in 1683, the Holy League of Linz gathered most European states in a common front against the Ottomans. In the resulting Great Turkish War the Ottoman Empire suffered a number of defeats such as the battles of Mohács and Zenta, and in the Treaty of Karlowitz, was forced to cede the bulk of Hungary to the Habsburg Monarchy, Podolia to Poland-Lithuania, while Azov was taken by the Russian Empire. Further south, the Republic of Venice had launched its own attack on the Ottoman Empire, seeking revenge for successive conquests of its overseas empire by the Turks, most recently the loss of Crete. During the conflict, Venetian troops seized the island of Cephalonia and the Morea peninsula, although they failed to retake Crete and expand their possessions in the Aegean Sea.
The Ottomans were from the outset determined to reverse their territorial losses, especially the Morea, whose loss had been particularly keenly felt in the Ottoman court: a large part of the income of the Valide Sultan had come from there. Already in 1702, there were tensions between the two powers and rumours of war because of the Venetian confiscation of an Ottoman merchant vessel. Troops and supplies were moved to the Ottoman provinces adjoining the Venetian "Kingdom of the Morea". The Venetian position there was weak, with only a few thousand troops in the whole peninsula, plagued by supply, disciplinary and morale problems. Nevertheless, peace was maintained between the two powers for twelve more years. In the meantime, the Ottomans began a reform of their navy, while Venice found itself increasingly isolated diplomatically from the other European powers: the Holy League had fractured after its victory, and the War of the Spanish Succession and the Great Northern War preoccupied the attention of most European states. The Ottomans took advantage of the favourable international situation and secured their northern flank by defeating Russia in 1710–1711. After the end of the Russo-Turkish war, the emboldened Ottoman leadership, under the new Grand Vizier, Silahdar Damat Ali Pasha, turned its attention to reversing the losses of Karlowitz. Profiting from the general war weariness that made any intervention by the other European powers unlikely, the Porte turned its focus on Venice.

Preparations and opposing forces

Venice

The inability of the Venetians to effectively defend the Morea had been apparent already during the latter stages of the Great Turkish War, when the Greek renegade Limberakis Gerakaris had launched dangerous raids into the peninsula. The Republic was well aware of the Ottoman ambitions to recover the Morea, both for reasons of prestige and because of the potential threat to the Ottoman possesions in the rest of Greece posed by Venetian possession of the peniunsula: with the Morea as a springboard, the Venetians might seek to reclaim Crete, or foment anti-Ottoman rebellions in the Balkans.

Ottomans

The Ottoman army in 1714 was still organized in the "classical" manner of the previous centuries, with a core of elite kapikulu troops, notably the Janissaries that formed the core of any expeditionary army, augmented by provincial levies and timariot cavalry. Ottoman armies were distinguished by the presence of large numbers of cavalry, which formed about 40% of a field army, but its effectiveness against European regular infantry had diminished much in the previous decades, as shown in the Great Turkish War. Still, it retained its tactical mobility, whereas the Ottoman infantry was a far more static force, capable either of last-stand defence or mass attack, but not much else. The indiscipline of the Janissaries also proved a constant headache for the Ottoman commanders.
During the early months of 1715, the Ottomans assembled their army in Macedonia under the Grand Vizier Silahdar Damat Ali Pasha. On 22 May, Grand Vizier marched south from Thessalonica, arriving at Thebes on 9 June, where he held a review of the troops. Although the accuracy of his figures is open to doubt, Brue reports 14,994 cavalry and 59,200 infantry as present at Thebes on 9 June, with the total number of men involved in the campaign against the Morea placed at 110,364. The cavalry numbers given by Brue are about half those expected for an Ottoman force of this size, indicating that likely the Ottoman commanders had to begin the campaign before their entire army was assembled. The army's artillery park comprised 111 light field guns, 15 larger siege guns, and 20 mortars.
The army was aided by the Ottoman fleet, which operated in close coordination with it. Like the Venetians, the Ottoman navy was a mixed force of sailing ships of the line and rowed galleys. The Ottomans also secured the assistance of their North African vassals, the regencies of Tripoli, Tunis, and Algiers, and their fleets. Commanded by the capable Kapudan Pasha Canım Hoca Mehmed Pasha, the fleet that sailed from the Dardanelles in June 1715 numbered 58 ships of the line, 30 galleys, five fireships, and 60 galliots, along with cargo vessels.
The Ottoman view on the campaign is known mostly through two eyewitness accounts, the diary of the French embassy interpreter Benjamin Brue, and that of Constantine the "Dioiketes", a guard officer to the Prince of Wallachia.

Attack on the Morea

After a war council on 13 June, 15,000 Janissaries under Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Pasha—governor of Diyarbekir Eyalet and nephew of the namesake Grand Vizier who led the Siege of Vienna in 1683— were sent to capture Lepanto, and thence cross into the northwestern Morea to attack the Castle of the Morea and Patras, while the main body of the army under Yusuf Pasha and the Agha of the Janissaries moved onto the Isthmus of Corinth, and thence to the Argolid and southwest, across the central Morea, to Messenia, assisted by supplies from the fleet. At the same time, the Ottoman fleet had captured the last Venetian possessions in the central Aegean, the islands of Tinos and Aigina, and proceeded to blockade the Venetian positions in the Morea. The Ottomans operated with impunity as the Venetian fleet remained in the Venetian Ionian Islands.
According to a report by Minotto, the Ottoman advance guard entered the Morea on 13 June. The first Venetian fortress was the citadel of Acrocorinth, held by little over 300 Venetian and about 110 Greek and Albanian auxiliaries. The Venetian garrison was weakened by maladies, and the artillery was badly maintained and with insufficient ammunition. By 2 July, the Ottomans had breached the walls in two places. As the fortress was about to fall, the large number of civilian refugees began pressuring Minotto to capitulate. Terms were arranged for the safe passage for the garrison to Corfu, and the garrison began leaving the citadel on 5 July. However, some Janissaries, eager for plunder, disobeyed Damat Ali's orders and entered the citadel. A large part of the garrison and most of the civilians were massacred or sold to slavery. Only 180 Venetians were saved and transported to Corfu. These tragic events later inspired Lord Byron's poem The Siege of Corinth.
After Corinth, the Ottomans passed by Argos on 9 July, which they found abandoned, and arrived before Nauplia three days later. Nauplia, the main stronghold of Venetian power in the Morea, was the best-fortified overseas possession of the Republic. With ample stores, a garrison of about 3,000 men, and an artillery complement of at least 150 guns, the city was expected to hold for at least three months, allowing for the arrival of reinforcements over the sea. On 20 July, after only nine days of siege, the Ottomans exploded a mine under the bastions of Palamidi and successfully stormed the fort. The Venetian defenders panicked and retreated, leading to a general collapse of the defence.
The Ottomans then advanced to the southwest, where the forts of Navarino and Koroni were abandoned by the Venetians, who gathered their remaining forces at Methoni. However, being denied effective support from the sea by Delfin's reluctance to endanger his fleet by engaging the Ottoman navy, the fort capitulated. The remaining Venetian strongholds, including the last remaining outposts on Crete, likewise capitulated in exchange for safe departure. Within a hundred days, the entire Peloponnese had been re-taken by the Ottomans.
According to the Ottomanist Virginia Aksan, the campaign had been "basically a walkover for the Ottomans". Despite the presence of sufficient materiel, the Venetian garrisons were weak, and the Venetian government unable to finance the war, while the Ottomans not only enjoyed a considerable numerical superiority, but also were more willing "to tolerate large losses and considerable desertion": according to Brue, no less than 8,000 Ottoman soldiers were killed and another 6,000 wounded in the just nine days of the siege of Nauplia. Furthermore, unlike the Venetians, the Ottomans this time enjoyed the effective support of their fleet, which among other activities ferried a number of large siege cannons to support the siege of Nauplia.
On 13 September, the Grand Vizier began his return journey, and on the 22nd, near Nauplia, received the congratulations of the Sultan. A week of parades and celebrations followed. On 10 October, the Standard of the Prophet was ceremonially placed in its casket, a sign that the campaign was over. The troops received six months' worth of pay on 17 October near Larissa, and the Grand Vizier returned to the capital, for a triumphal entrance, on 2 December.