Signal Intelligence Regiment (KONA)

History

Organization and Functions

KONA Regiment

Signal Intelligence Evaluation Centre (NAAS)

1. Four types of activity was included for the Evaluation and Traffic Analysis of intercepts:
   
   
   
   1. Technical and tactical evaluation of
      The NAAS centre was situated close to an Army Group HQ The NAAS functionality included evaluation and traffic analysis, cryptanalysis, collation and dissemination of intelligence.
      
      
      
      1. Four types of activity was included for the Evaluation and Traffic Analysis of intercepts:
         
         
         
         1. Technical and tactical evaluation of all identified intercepts, i.e. picked up by Long Range units.
         2. 
            Processing of all unidentified intercepts. Traffic analysis from both long and short range units including intercepts which may not be from the enemy armies.
            
         3. 
            Checking and tactical evaluation of reports from Short Range units.
            
         4. 
            Traffic analysis, Direction finding evaluation, update of registry card index, NKVD evaluation and Russian Air force intercepts processing.
            
      2. 
         Cryptanalysis in the NAAS primarily meant the solution of unknown systems, the study of developments in known systems, and work on NKVD ciphers and processes. The NAAS worked on 4-figure Russian ciphers.
         
      3. 
         The NAAS was responsible for the dissemination of intelligence, passing its results to the Intelligence Officer of the associated Army Group, and also forwarding the intelligence to the Signal Intelligence Agency of the OKH/GDNA
         
      4. 
         The NAAS had a key position in the direction of coverage for interception. Through the chain of command, it controlled the intercept coverage for all lower units with co-ordination by staff of the headquarters of OKH/GDNA controlling everything else Certain items were passed unprocessed straight to the GDNA cryptanalysis unit. Ciphers from the NKVD that were formatted using 5-figure groups were passed automatically to the GDNA cryptanalysis unit for additional cryptanalysis.
         

Stationary Intercept Company (FESTE)

Long Range Intelligence Company (FAK)

Close Range Intelligence Company (NAK)

Close Range Signal Intelligence Platoons (NAZ)

Signal Intelligence Battalion (NAA)

Operations

Direction Finding

Direction finding techniques

History of Kona Units

Kona 1

Headquarters

NAAS 1

Feste 10

FAK 617

FAK 623

NAK 954

NAK 953

NAK Benold

NAK Preuss

Kona 2

Kona 3

Kona 4

NAAS 4

Feste 5

Feste 6

NAZ T

NAZ W

Kona 5

1. NAAS 5

   NAAS 5 was located close to Paris at Saint-Germain-en-Laye. The unit had about 150 personnel, consisting of interpreters, cryptanalysts, evaluators, Draughtsman, switchboard operators and telephonists, drivers, clerks. In addition, some women auxiliaries were available, particularly for telephonist and switchboard work. The internal organization of NAAS 5 is not known
   

2. Feste 12

   The unit was subordinated to NAAS 5 until early 1944, when it joined with Feste 3 to form NAA 12. Feste 12 organisation consisted of a radio intercept platoon, and a telephone communication unit. When it was attached to NAAS 5, Feste 12 has no cryptanalysis or evaluation personnel since this work was being done at NAAS 5. The strength of Feste 12 was estimated at 120 men and 30 women auxiliaries
   

3. Feste 2

   According to a prisoner's account the organization of Feste 3, the former Army intercept station at Münster, closely approximated Feste 3. It had a radio intercept platoon, a D/F platoon, and an evaluation platoon consisting of two sections: one for the evaluation of content of messages, content evaluation and one for the evaluation of traffic, traffic analysis. In 1944, Feste 2 combined with Feste 9 and FAK 613 to form NAA 13. When NAA 13 was broken up in November 1944, Feste 2 was subordinated directly to the Senior Commander of Signal Intelligence in the West, Major General William Gimmler.
   

4. Feste 3

   Feste 3 was the original Army intercept station at Euskirchen. Early in the war it had been subordinated to KONA 5. Administered independently in 1944, it combined with Feste 12 to form NAA 12. When KONA 5 was reorganized in the fall of 1944, Feste 3 was combined with the Long Range Signal Intelligence Company: FAK 626, which had been brought from the Eastern Front to form NAA 14. This organization was valid until the end of the war The internal organization of Feste 3 is described by a liaison officer, Lt. Hans Lehwald, who was attached to it. He stated that it consisted of a radio reception platoon of approximately 70 receivers, and an evaluation platoon of 25-30 men. The evaluation was broken into section for traffic analysis, cryptanalysis, evaluation, D/F and filing section for diagrams of the nets, call signs, personalities, code names and D/F results
   

5. Feste 9

   Feste 9 was a Stationary Intercept Company formed in Frankfurt in the Spring of 1942 and sent to Norway in July of that year. It was first stationed at Trondheim, later in Bergen, and in the Spring of 1944 at Ski near Oslo. Between the summer of 1944 and the following winter, most of the personnel were moved to Italy and by Christmas 1944, there was nothing left of the unit in Norway While in Norway, Feste 9 was organized along the lines of a Long Range Signal Intelligence Company, with a HQ platoon, an intercept platoon· or BO-120men, a D/F platoon, a radio reconnaissance platoon of about 20 men, and an evaluation section of about 30 men. The evaluation section had one subsection for the evaluation of message contents one for traffic, and one for cryptanalysis When in Norway, Feste 9 was, subordinated to KONA 5. It can be surmised, however, that its connection with KONA was always more flexible than that other units because of its geographical position in Norway. When NAA 13 was broken up, Feste 5 remained under the supervision of KONA 5 until it was shifted to Italy under KONA 7
   

6. FAK 624

   FAK 624 was formed at Montpellier on 16 April 1943 and attached to KONA 5 In February 1944, FAK 624 was subordinated to NAA 14 of KONA 5, and in late Autumn it combined with Feste 3 to form the reorganized NAA 14. The unit was composed of an intercept platoon and an evaluation platoon. For transport, FAK 624 is said to have approximately 85 vehicles with six special French radio trucks and trailers for D/F equipment. The strength of the company was roughly 250 men including interpreters, code clerks, cryptanalysts, radio intercept operations and 90 drivers.
   

7. FAK 613

   FAK 613 belonged to KONA 5, in so far as is known from its inception. In February 1944 FAK 613 combined with Feste 2 and Feste 9 to form NAA 13. When this battalion was broken up in late 1944, FAK 613 was reassigned to KONA 6, where it remained until the end of the war. Little is known about the organization other than its organization paralleled that of FAK 624.
   

8. FAK 626

   FAK 626 was established in August 1943, trained until January 1944 and was activated in Winniza. Its original mission was originally the interception of traffic of the 1st French Army, and the 7th American Army and later that of the 1st, 3rd and 9th American Armies. It was subordinated to an eastern KONA, perhaps KONA 8 and was stationed in the Ukraine. In October 1944, FAK 626 was sent to Landau where it was tutored in western traffic and reorganized. In November 1944, it met FAK 624 at Landau, and both units were sent west to KONA 5 with which they remained until the end of the war. The strength of FAK 626 on the Russian Front was around 250-300 men of whom 80-100 men were intercept operators, 10-15 D/F operators, 10-15 cryptanalysts, 5-7 translators, 10 were traffic analysts. The unit was greatly under strength on the Western Front.
   

Kona 6

1. 
   FAK 613. FAK 613 was given by KONA 5 to KONA 6 in late 1944. Nothing is known of the organization of this unit, but was likely the same as other Long Range Signal Intelligence Companies.
   
2. 
   FAK 611. FAK 6111 was active in the Eastern front during the Russian campaign from June 1941. It was also stationed in Poland, where it was attached to Army Group Centre. In November 1944, FAK 611 was moved to the western front and subordinated to KONA 6, NAA 9 Nothing is known about the size of FAK 611 on the eastern front. On the western front, it was small enough to occupy a house in Zutphen, the Netherlands. It consisted of 30-40 radio and telephone operators, 10 cryptanalysts and decoders, and 25 evaluators
   
3. 
   FAK 610. FAK 610 was activated in 1940 for operations on the eastern front Subordinated to KONA 2, it worked at Tilsit in September 1940 and later settled at Volkhov, where it intercepted Russian traffic. In November 1944, it was transferred to the western front where it was subordinated to NAA 13 of KONA 6
   

Kona 7

1. NAAS 7

   NAAS 7 was organized into cryptography, cryptanalysis, evaluation. The evaluation sections included immediate, tactical, D/F, traffic, content, and final evaluation. The strength of the evaluation centre was about 150 men.
   

2. Feste 1

   Feste 1, the former Army intercept station in Stuttgart, which had been stationed in Strasbourg in 1940, Brittany in 1941, and later that year in Montpellier, and later they moved to Italy and was attached to KONA 7 in 1943 The main task of Feste 1, was interception. No evaluation was done by the personnel who consisted of radio intercept operations, telegraph and telephone operators and D/F operators.
   

3. Feste 9

   The origin of Feste 9 is described under KONA 5.
   

4. FAK 621

   FAK 621 was created in 1942 from the remnants of former 3rd intercept company: NA 56 at Bielefeld. Most of the original FAK 621 was captured in the North African Campaign on 10 July 1942. The remnants of the company continued to work on Allied systems until May 1943, when the Allies captured the unit in Tunisia Nothing is known of the organization of the company.
   

Kona 8

FAK 620

Kona Nord

NAA 11

• Daily News Report
• Enemy Situation Report

Aspects of Evaluation and Cryptanalysis in the KONA Regiment

Evaluation in the NAAS

• observation and interpretation of known radio nets,
• the study of unidentified traffic and
• in the results of cryptanalysis.

• Names
• Cover-names.
• 5-figure characteristics.
• D/F results
• Map Coordinates
• Key usage
• Contents of decoded signals.
• Technical characteristics

Card Indexes

1. 
   Personality Index: This index listed all officers and radio operators whose names were derived not only from radio but from all sources. All names were treated with caution due to the Russian propensity of using cover names. There was a special file for indexing these. When the entry was clarified, a suitable entry was made on the card. Example data:
   AIESKOWSKIJ, OBERST. Chief Signals Officer, 1st Ukrainian Front. or GWANOW, Major. Area 6th Pz. Army
   
2. 
   Unit Index: This file contained all information available from all sources on all Russian units. Each card was designed to list the following item: unit, commanding officer, chief of staff, components to which the unit was subordinate, subordinate units comprising the unit in question, location, date of first appearance, and sources of information.
   
3. 
   Blocknot Index:
   Notes on Blocknots. The highest level code used by Soviet forces during World War II, in the East, was the 5-figure codebook enciphered with Blocknot book, where each page had a random sequence of numbers, organized in numbered rows and columns. There were two types or categories of Blocknots:
   
   • The Individual in which each table of random numbers was used only once.
   • The General in which each page of the Blocknot was valid for one day. The security of the additive sequence rested on the choice of different starting points for each message. In 5-figure messages, the blocknot was one of the first 10 Groups in the message. Its position changed at long intervals, but was always easy to re-identify. The Russians differentiated between three types of blocks:
   1. The 3-block, DRIERBLOCK also called I-BLOCK, i.e. individual block, that could be used and read only between two wireless telegraphy stations on one net.
   2. The 6-block, SECHSERBLOCK, also called Z-BLOCK, i.e. circular block, that could be used and read, between all W/T stations in a net.
   3. The 2-block, ZWEIERBLOCK, also called the OS-BLOCK, used only in traffic from lower to higher formations.
   
   
   The Chi-number was the serial numbering of all 5-figure messages passing through the hands of the Cipher Officer, starting on the first of January and ending on thirty-first December of the current year. It always appeared as the last group in an intercepted message, e.g. 00001 on 1 January, or when the unit was newly set up. The progression of Chi-numbers was carefully observed and recorded in the form of a graph. A Russian corps had about 10 5-figure messages per day, and Army about 20-30 and a Front about 60-100. After only a relatively short time, the individual curves separated sharply and the type of formation could be recognized by the height of the Chi-number alone.
   Blocknot Index: Both Blocknots and Chi-numbers were contained in the same index. A careful recording and study of blocks provided the positive clues in the identification and the tracking of formations using 5-figure codes. The index was subdivided into two files: one, the search card index, contained all blocknots and chi-numbers whether or not they were known; the other, the unit card index, contained only known Block and Chi-numbers. Inspector Berger observed that the two files formed:
   
4. 
   Key Index: This index contained all solved keys, irrespective of the areas in which they were used. They were arranged according to the German designation of the Russian keys. The German system of key designation includes a self-evident description of the code plus an allotted number, e.g. R4ZC 1800: meaning 4-Zahlen Code 1800/Russian 4-figure code 1800/333 The 2 and 3-figure keys were peculiar to definite formations and with this certain inferences about the formation in question could sometimes be made on the basis of the key alone.
   
5. 
   Call Sign Index: All call signs picked up on the entire Eastern front, known or unknown, were listed in this index, which showed not only the call signs, but also the connection in which it previously might have appeared. The index was fully cross-references and was relied upon not only for spot identification of call-signs but for building new call-sign blocks. Each card had a reference, the Network No.
   
6. 
   Cover Name Index: The Russian Soviet forces used cover names abundantly, not only for units, but for common military expressions and tactical measures as well. Some were so consistently used that all disguise was lost, and they became accepted expressions. On the whole they presented no great difficulty and could usually be interpreted successfully.
   All cover names obtained were scrupulously recorded by the Index Section. In many cases nearly complete cover tables were reconstructed from the various Russian fronts.
   
7. 
   Coordinates Index: The map coordinates derived by the solution of Russian map reference systems were recorded in this index, the co-ords being arranged both by the system and by the unit making use of the system. It is significant that even though the coordinate system might not be understood, the method itself might be enough to furnish important clues facilitating the tracking of a particular formation.
   
8. 
   Direction Findings Bearings. This file consisted of a listing of the various bearings on each Russia radio station obtained through direction finding, and helped the NAAS to estimate the value and significance of the bearings. Direction finding became increasingly important as one of the branches of signal intelligence, as Russian wireless discipline and cipher security became better and better as the war progressed. D/F requests to fix a W/T station by long range D/F within 15 km, or by close range D/F of about 2,3 km.
   
9. 
   Air Traffic Index: Russian Air Traffic was frequently picked up by operators assigned to search missions. In order to spot this intercept as Air traffic, a catalogue of its characteristics was necessary; and to accomplish this, a special index was set up in the NAAS. In this index were recorded not only the statistics derived from German Army interception of Air traffic, but also data supplied by units of the Luftwaffe. The statistics gathered were passed to the Long Range Signal Intelligence Companies, which were likely to pick up Air traffic. The companies did not have separate air data indexes, but kept the data in the Army card index.
   

Evaluation in the Feste

1. The first task of the Traffic Evaluation Sections was to work up the information into a network diagram, which not only represented the net structure but listed all pertinent information and formed the basic medium studied. The diagram contained:
2. :* The net number.
3. :* The date
4. :* Traffic workings with call signs.
5. :* The number and kind of messages sent.
6. :* The Direction finding number
7. :* Block numbers and Chi-numbers on any 5-figure messages.
8. :* Short plain text messages when available.
9. Study of the network diagram in the 5-figure section.
10. :*Identification of the W/T station sending the 5-figure message was the first step. The Blocknot and chi-numbers were studied and checked against the previously indexed or charted data in the index cards archive.
11. :*The BLOCKNOT with almost the same number in the index.
12. :*Identification by CHI-number alone checked against the Chi-number graph.
13. :*Identification of general class, e.g. Army traffic) by other 5-figure characteristics.
14. All diagrams passed through the Traffic Analysis Section where the network diagrams were studied.
15. :*General scrutiny of composition of call signs.
16. :*Determination of area covered by net comparison of call signs used with 'Basic Book for Allotment of Call-Signs'
17. :*Recording and collecting of call signs still that were unclarified, in order to recover new call sign systems.
18. Checking of the network diagrams and messages against the card indexes of names, cover-names and cover-numbers.
19. :*Identification of names and numbers by means of the index;hints for interpretation already entered on the network diagram taken into account.
20. The network diagrams were passed to the Direction Finding Evaluation Section, which determined by the location of the fixes whether the intercept was likely to be, e.g. Army or Air Force; or Line of Communication traffic, in the rear.
21. :*Does the D/F fix, if any, point to an area near the front? If so, probably Army traffic.
22. :*Does the D/F fix, if any, point to the rear area? If so, Air Force, or Line of Communication traffic.
23. The diagrams went finally to the Final evaluation or Fusion Section, where the results entered on the diagram by the various sections were weighted and considered in the light of information passed to the Final Evaluation unit by the Cryptanalysis section. The findings guided modification of the cover towards dropping the less important traffic and placing more sets on the interesting circuits.
24. :*Decision on the identity of the traffic, taking into consideration:
25. ::*the balance of the results entered on the network diagrams by the various sections.
26. ::*results obtained by the cryptanalysis section.
27. :*Reports to NAAS on:
28. ::*identified traffics.
29. ::*tactical information derived from the messages.
30. :*Guidance for interception:
31. ::*Cover of less interesting traffic suspended.
32. ::*Special attention to more interesting traffic ordered.

Evaluation in the FAK

Cryptanalysis in the KONA

NAAS

1. 2-figure codes and cyphers
2. 3-figure codes and cyphers
3. 4-figure codes and cyphers
4. New developments
5. Analysis
6. NKVD
7. Code building
8. P/L text scrutiny
9. Organisation

1. 
   To collect and work on the traffic which the companies could not deal with, whether because of lack of material or preoccupation with more important systems.
   
2. 
   To test and check doubtful solutions passed up by the companies.
   
3. 
   To establish whether keys broken by the companies were the first examples of their kind; to complete them and put them in a handy workable form, i.e. basic form, and to assign a number to each key appearing in the area of the regiment.
   
4. 
   To pass back down all solved key systems to companies who might be concerned.
   
5. 
   To assign a number to each key appearing in the Regiments area.
   
6. 
   To work on NKVD signals.
   

• Work on 2,3, 4-figure Addresses.
• Work on 5-figure Signals, letter systems.
• Examination of Signals with practice traffic characteristics.
• Reduction of solved keys to a basic form.

FESTE AND FAK

Reports resulting from Evaluation

• Twice-daily Network Reports
• Advance Reports
• Daily Situation Reports for a summary of the days Advance Reports and all less important data.

• Direction dinding reports
• Radio traffic reports
• Radio clear text reports
• Radio code-text reports

TICOM Publications

• Missing TICOM Documents

• TICOM DF-18 "Russian Decryption in the Former German Army" by Dettmann and Samsonow.
• TICOM I-116 "Interrogation of Ltn. Alex Dettmann and Oberwachtmeister Sergius Samsonow of OKH at Oberursel, Germany, during August 1945."
• TICOM IF-171 "Report on Further Information obtained from Uffz. Kotschy and Uffz. Boscheinen both of Festungs art Abt 1518, deserted at Diffenbach 22 November 1944."
• TICOM IF-120 "First detailed interrogation report on Thomas Barthel."
• TICOM documents IF-144, IF-127, IF-105, IF-10, IF-40 still remain secret and have not been released by the NSA.