Vaisheshika
Vaisheshika or Vaiśeṣika is one of the six schools of Indian philosophy from ancient India. In its early stages, the Vaiśeṣika was an independent philosophy with its own metaphysics, epistemology, logic, ethics, and soteriology. Over time, the Vaiśeṣika system became similar in its philosophical procedures, ethical conclusions and soteriology to the Nyāya school of Hinduism, but retained its difference in epistemology and metaphysics.
The epistemology of Vaiśeṣika school of Hinduism, like Buddhism, accepted only two reliable means to knowledge: perception and inference. Vaiśeṣika school and Buddhism both consider their respective scriptures as indisputable and valid means to knowledge, the difference being that the scriptures held to be a valid and reliable source by Vaiśeṣikas were the Vedas.
Vaisheshika school is known for its insights in naturalism. It is a form of atomism in natural philosophy. It postulated that all objects in the physical universe are reducible to paramāṇu, and one's experiences are derived from the interplay of substance, quality, activity, commonness, particularity and inherence. Everything was composed of atoms, qualities emerged from aggregates of atoms, but the aggregation and nature of these atoms was predetermined by cosmic forces. Ajivika metaphysics included a theory of atoms which was later adapted in Vaiśeṣika school.
According to Vaiśeṣika school, knowledge and liberation were achievable by a complete understanding of the world of experience..
Vaiśeṣika darshana was founded by Kaṇāda Kashyapa around the 6th to 2nd century BC.
Overview
Although the Vaisheshika system developed independently from the Nyaya school of Hinduism, the two became similar and are often studied together. In its classical form, however, the Vaishesika school differed from the Nyaya in one crucial respect: where Nyaya accepted four sources of valid knowledge, the Vaishesika accepted only two.The epistemology of Vaiśeṣika school of Hinduism accepted only two reliable means to knowledge – perception and inference.
Vaisheshika espouses a form of atomism, that the reality is composed of five substances. Each of these five are of two types, explains Ganeri, and composite. A paramāṇu is that which is indestructible, indivisible, and has a special kind of dimension, called “small”. A composite is that which is divisible into paramāṇu. Whatever human beings perceive is composite, and even the smallest perceptible thing, namely, a fleck of dust, has parts, which are therefore invisible. The Vaiśeṣikas visualized the smallest composite thing as a “triad” with three parts, each part with a “dyad”. Vaiśeṣikas believed that a dyad has two parts, each of which is an atom. Size, form, truths and everything that human beings experience as a whole is a function of parmanus, their number and their spatial arrangements.
Parama means "most distant, remotest, extreme, last" and aṇu means "atom, very small particle", hence paramāṇu is essentially "the most distant or last small particle".
Vaisheshika postulated that what one experiences is derived from dravya, guna, karma, samanya, vishesha and nsamavaya.
Epistemology
Hinduism identifies six Pramāṇas as epistemically reliable means to accurate knowledge and to truths: Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Upamāna, Arthāpatti, Anupalabdhi and Śabda. Of these epistemology considered only pratyakṣa and as reliable means of valid knowledge. Nyaya school, related to Vaiśeṣika, accepts four out of these six.- Pratyakṣa means perception. It is of two types: external and internal. External perception is described as that arising from the interaction of five senses and worldly objects, while internal perception is described by this school as that of inner sense, the mind. The ancient and medieval texts of Hinduism identify four requirements for correct perception: Indriyarthasannikarsa, Avyapadesya, Avyabhicara and Vyavasayatmaka. Some ancient scholars proposed "unusual perception" as pramāṇa and called it internal perception, a proposal contested by other Indian scholars. The internal perception concepts included pratibha, samanyalaksanapratyaksa, and jnanalaksanapratyaksa. Further, the texts considered and refined rules of accepting uncertain knowledge from Pratyakṣa-pranama, so as to contrast nirnaya from anadhyavasaya.
- Anumāna means inference. It is described as reaching a new conclusion and truth from one or more observations and previous truths by applying reason. Observing smoke and inferring fire is an example of Anumana. In all except one Hindu philosophies, this is a valid and useful means to knowledge. The method of inference is explained by Indian texts as consisting of three parts: pratijna, hetu, and drshtanta. The hypothesis must further be broken down into two parts, state the ancient Indian scholars: sadhya and paksha. The inference is conditionally true if sapaksha are present, and if vipaksha are absent. For rigor, the Indian philosophies also state further epistemic steps. For example, they demand Vyapti - the requirement that the hetu must necessarily and separately account for the inference in "all" cases, in both sapaksha and vipaksha. A conditionally proven hypothesis is called a nigamana.
Syllogism
Literature
The earliest systematic exposition of the Vaisheshika is found in the Vaisheshika Sutra| of . This treatise is divided into ten books. The two commentaries on the, and are no more extant. Prashastapada|’s is the next important work of this school. Though commonly known as of, this treatise is basically an independent work on the subject. The next Vaisheshika treatise, Candra’s based on ’s treatise is available only in Chinese translation. The earliest commentary available on ’s treatise is ’s . The other three commentaries are ’s , Udayana’s and ’s . ’s which also belongs to the same period, presents the and the principles as a part of one whole. ’s on is also an important work.The Categories or ''Padārtha''
According to the Vaisheshika school, all things that exist, that can be cognized and named are s, the objects of experience. All objects of experience can be classified into six categories, dravya, , karma, , and . Later s added one more category abhava. The first three categories are defined as artha and they have real objective existence. The last three categories are defined as and they are logical categories.- Dravya : The substances are conceived as 9 in number. They are, , ap, tejas, , , , dik, and manas. The first five are called s, the substances having some specific qualities so that they could be perceived by one or the other external senses.
- : The mentions 17 s, to which added another 7. While a substance is capable of existing independently by itself, a cannot exist so. The original 17 s are, , rasa, gandha, , , , , , , paratva, aparatva, buddhi, sukha, , , and prayatna. To these added gurutva, dravatva, sneha, dharma, adharma, and .
- Karma : The karmas like s have no separate existence, they belong to the substances. But while a quality is a permanent feature of a substance, an activity is a transient one. , , dik and , though substances, are devoid of karma.
- : Since there are plurality of substances, there will be relations among them. When a property is found common to many substances, it is called.
- : By means of, we are able to perceive substances as different from one another. As the ultimate atoms are innumerable so are the s.
- : defined as the relation between the cause and the effect. defined it as the relationship existing between the substances that are inseparable, standing to one another in the relation of the container and the contained. The relation of is not perceivable but only inferable from the inseparable connection of the substances.
The atomic theory
The measure of the partless atoms is known as parimaṇḍala parimāṇa. It is eternal and it cannot generate the measure of any other substance. Its measure is its own absolutely.
The early Vaiśeṣika texts presented the following syllogism to prove that all objects i.e. the four bhūtas, pṛthvī, ap, tejas and vāyu are made of indivisible paramāṇus : Assume that the matter is not made of indivisible atoms, and that it is continuous. Take a stone. One can divide this up into infinitely many pieces. Now, the Himalayan mountain range also has infinitely many pieces, so one may build another Himalayan mountain range with the infinite number of pieces that one has. One begins with a stone and ends up with the Himalayas, which is a paradox - so the original assumption that matter is continuous must be wrong, and so all objects must be made up of a finite number of paramāṇus.