2004 Cypriot Annan Plan referendums

Background

Campaign

Republic of Cyprus

Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

Referendum question

Results

Aftermath

Participation issues

Reaction

Greek Cypriots

Turkish Cypriots

Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom

European Union

Other international reaction

• United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan: A unique and historic chance to resolve the Cyprus problem has been missed.
• European Commission: The European Commission deeply regrets that the Greek Cypriot community did not approve the comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem, but it respects the democratic decision of the people.
• US State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher: We are disappointed that a majority of Greek Cypriots voted against the settlement plan. Failure of the referendum in the Greek Cypriot community is a setback to the hopes of those on the island who voted for the settlement and to the international community.
• European Commissioner for Enlargement Günter Verheugen: I feel cheated by the Greek Cypriot government… There is a shadow now over the accession of Cyprus. What we will seriously consider now is finding a way to end the economic isolation of the Turkish Cypriots.
• UN Special Envoy Álvaro de Soto: This evening I'm biting my tongue.

  Causes of the outcome

Reasons for approval by Turkish Cypriots

• Reunification was desired for economic reasons.
• Many Turkish Cypriots no longer perceived the Greek Cypriots as a threat, especially in the light of the strictly bi-zonal proposition of the Annan plan.
• Turkish Cypriots would receive considerable constitutional power in the United Cyprus Republic that the Annan plan proposed, over-proportional to their percentage of the population.
• In 2009 mainland Turkish press reported that in the elections that were then taking place 38% of those eligible to vote were Turkish-Cypriots, the majority being Turkish settlers. It might be reasonable to make the assumption that this would have been a similar five years earlier.
• The Turkish Cypriot component state would still, even after territorial cession of some areas to the Greek Cypriot component state, make up 28.5 percent of the total area of Cyprus, including large economically important areas that were inhabited exclusively by Greek Cypriots prior to the division of Cyprus in 1974.
• The right of return of Greek Cypriots to their homes in the areas coming under the control of the Turkish Cypriot component state would be strictly limited if not, in some cases, forbidden, thus the possibility of Turkish Cypriots becoming a minority in their respective component state would not exist.
• The guarantor states for the Constitution of Cyprus would retain their powers as such, thus Turkey would still arguably have the right to intervene in Cypriot affairs, most definitely on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots and vice versa.
• The Annan plan did not attribute blame, Turkey was not blamed or punished for the invasion in 1974.

  Reasons for rejection by the Greek Cypriots

• The Turkish Cypriot constituent state, would have been integrated to Turkey making United Cyprus Republic answerable to Turkey.
• Turkey was granted rights to interfere with the Treaty between Egypt and the Republic of Cyprus on the Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone. Cyprus' rights to its Continental Shelf in the south would have also been answerable to Turkey.
• Turkey was granted the right of stationing Turkish troops on the island of Cyprus perpetually, again making full independence impossible.
• The Ethnic groups in Cyprus are Greek 77%, Turkish 18%, other 5% of the population. The Annan plan equates the representation of the two major ethnic groups in the proposed Senate and in the Supreme Court giving 50-50 representation to the two communities. The majority becomes a minority in important decision centres.
• The plan created a confederation even though it utilised the term "federation" because there was no hierarchy of laws, while central authority emanated from the so-called component states. Note that the United States abandoned its original confederal structure because it was unworkable. In 1789, a federal constitution was established containing a clear federal supremacy clause. The Supreme Court composed of equal numbers of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot judges, plus three foreign judges; thus foreign actors would cast deciding votes.
• The Plan did not include a settlement regarding the repatriation of Turkish settlers living on Greek Cypriot owned land in Northern Cyprus, while after 19 years, the possibility of abolishing the derogation of 5% of Greeks and Turkish citizens who could settle in Cyprus, is obvious, and the danger of a permanent mass settling of Cyprus by Turkey is visible.
• Nearly all the Turkish settlers would be granted citizenship or residence rights leading to citizenship. The central government would have limited control towards future Turkish Immigration. Those settlers opting to return to Turkey would be compensated by Cyprus and Greek Cypriots. Even though Turkey systematically brought in the settlers to alter the demography of the island, it had no responsibility for their Repatriation.
• The Plan simply disregarded the plain language and clear meaning of the Geneva Convention of 1949, section III, article 49, which prohibits colonisation by an occupying power. Article 49 states in its last paragraph: "The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies."
• The Plan did not deal in full with the issue of demilitarisation of the legally invalid 'TRNC', and Greek Cypriots felt they had no reason to believe Turkish promises concerning the withdrawal of troops.
• Cyprus would be excluded from the European Common Defense and Foreign Policy, while Turkish troops would remain in Cyprus even after the accession of Turkey to the EU with intervention rights,, in the future Greek Cypriot component state.
• Many Greek Cypriots interpreted the Right of Return policy as seriously flawed, meaning only 20% of Greek Cypriot refugees would be able to return over a time frame of 25 years, whereas Turkish Cypriots would have had full right of return. The plan denied to all Cypriots rights enjoyed by all other EU citizens.
• Turkish Cypriots would have gained all their requested demands in the 24 hours following the referendum, had the plan been accepted. Greek Cypriot demands, however, were relegated to the long term - as well as being dependent on the good will of Turkey to fulfil its obligations.
• The return of the Turkish occupied land will take place in the period between three and a half months and three and a half years from the moment the solution is signed with no guarantees whatsoever that this shall be implemented. The Cypriot-Greek proposal of placing these areas under the control of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus and not the Turkish army has been rejected.
• The Plan did not address the issue of the British Sovereign Base Areas on the island, although parts of the SBAs would be transferred to the governments of the two constituent states.
• The British were granted rights to unilaterally define the continental shelf and territorial waters along two base areas and to claim potential mineral rights. Under the 1959-1960 Zürich and London Agreements, Britain did not have such rights.
• The plan absolved Turkey of all responsibility for its invasion of Cyprus and its murders, rapes, destruction of property and churches, looting and forcing approximately 200,000 Greek Cypriots from their homes and property. The Cyprus government filed applications to the European Commission on Human Rights on September 17, 1974 and on March 21, 1975. The Commission issued its report on the charges made in the two applications on July 10, 1976. In it the Commission found Turkey guilty of violating the following articles of the European Convention on Human Rights:

1. Article 2 - by the killing of innocent civilians committed on a substantial scale;
2. Article 3 - by the rape of women of all ages from 12 to 71;
3. Article 3 - by inhuman treatment of prisoners and persons detained;
4. Article 5 - by deprivation of liberty with regard to detainees and missing persons - a continuing violation;
5. Article 8 - by displacement of persons creating more than 180,000 Greek Cypriot refugees, and be refusing to allow the refugees to return to their homes.

• The plan failed to provide payment by Turkey:

1. for the lives of innocent civilians killed by the Turkish army;
2. for the victims of rape by the Turkish army;
3. for the vast destruction of property and churches by the Turkish army; and
4. for the substantial looting by the Turkish army.

• The Plan subverted the property rights of the Greek Cypriots and other legal owners of property in the occupied area:
• *by prohibiting recourse to European courts on property issues;
• *by withdrawing all pending cases at the European Court of Human Rights and transferring them to local courts;
• *by allowing Turkish Cypriots and illegal mainland Turk settlers/colonists to keep Greek Cypriot homes and property they were illegally given following Turkey's invasion of Cyprus and not having to reimburse the rightful owners of the property for 30 years of illegal use;
• *by a highly complicated, ambiguous and uncertain regime for resolving property issues and which is based on the principle that real property owners can ultimately be forced to give up their property rights which would violate the European Convention on Human Rights and international law. The Greek Cypriot property owners would have to be reimbursed by the federal treasury which would be funded overwhelmingly by the Greek Cypriots, meaning that Greek Cypriots would be reimbursing themselves.
• The Plan would have the effect of protecting those British citizens who illegally bought Greek Cypriot property from settlers or persons who are not owners; in the occupied north of Cyprus. They would, in effect, not be held responsible for their illegal action.
• The cost of economic reunification would be borne by the Greek Cypriots. The reunification cost has been estimated close to $20b
• Following Annan 5 plan the Greek Cypriots would not have been allowed to make up more than 6% of the population in any single village in the Turkish controlled areas in the north thus they would have been prevented from setting up their own schools for their children and would not have even been able to give birth once this quota was reached.
• The agreement places time restrictions in the right of free, permanent installation of Greek Cypriots back to their homes and properties in them to be Turkish Cypriot state, which constitutes a deviation from the European Union practices. Those Greek Cypriot refugees that would return to their homes in regions under Turkish Cypriot administration would have no local civil rights, because the political representatives of Turkish Cypriot state would be elected only from Turkish Cypriots.
• The functional weaknesses of the Plan endanger, inter alia, the smooth activity and participation of Cyprus, with one voice, in the European Union. While the Greek Cypriots have with many sacrifices achieved Cyprus accession to the European Union, the Greek Cypriots could very easily be led to the neutralization of the accession until the adoption of all necessary federal and regional legal measures or the loss of the benefits of the accession or the facing of obstacles in Cyprus participation in the Economic and Monetary Union and other European institutions.
• The Economy of Cyprus would have been separate with the plan. There will be no common Monetary policy, fiscal policy and no investments by Greek Cypriot businesses shall be allowed in the Turkish Cypriot constituent state.
• Many Greek-Cypriots felt that the demand that the Cyprus issue be resolved before Cyprus' entry to the EU was so that the reunification would not have to contain elements of European law which were incompatible with certain provisions in the Annan Plan. This was further backed up by many who demanded the EU accept all derogations even if they violate European Court Decisions, European Law and UN Security Council Resolutions. Both Romano Prodi and Günter Verheugen repeatedly indicated that any such derogations should only be for a short period of time and should not violate any European Laws.